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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS IN OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS 
by 
Umut Unal 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor 
This dissertation raises a number of policy concerns from a macroeconomic 
policy point of view and provides additional insights and implications in terms of the 
effects of fiscal policy and its macroeconomic effects that have kept the open economy 
macroeconomics literature busy since the early 2000s. 
The first essay develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
for analyzing the impact of various capital income tax policies in a small open economy 
that is populated by households possessing endogenous time preferences. I contribute to 
the literature by studying the impacts of: i) anticipated tax shocks under stochastically 
growing output, ii) stochastic tax shocks under deterministic output, on a dynamic 
general equilibrium framework. With the model's specifications, this is the first attempt 
to integrate uncertainty in the study of taxation and welfare. The results suggest that 
under certain conditions welfare paradoxes may exist, in the sense that increases in tax 
instruments may improve welfare.  
The second essay characterizes the dynamic effects of net tax and government 
spending shocks on prices, interest rate, GDP and its private components in four OECD 
countries using structural vector autoregressive regressions (SVAR) approach. For the 
vi 
 
first time in this literature, I propose a structural decomposition of total net taxes into four 
components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social insurance 
taxes. The paper provides estimates of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to 
innovations in these net tax components. Decompositions of total net tax innovations 
show that net tax components have different impacts on economic variables. Moreover, 
the size and persistence of these effects vary across countries depending upon the 
strength of wealth, substitution, and income effects reflecting the structure of the 
economies. 
The last essay estimates the wealth effects of housing and stock market wealth 
using time-series data for eight developed countries. In estimation I employ the SVAR, 
which articulate the dynamic interactions of shocks to housing prices, stock values, and 
disposable incomes. The results show that for these countries the initial consumption 
response to housing price shocks is greater than to stock market capitalization shocks, but 
the long-run consumption response to the latter is more persistent than to the former. My 
findings suggest balanced monetary policies for the developments of housing markets 
and equity markets. 
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CHAPTER I 
CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION AND WELFARE UNDER DSGE 
FRAMEWORK 
I.I. Introduction 
“It is often said that nothing is certain in life except death and taxes. While death 
is undoubtedly certain, there is, in fact, considerable uncertainty with respect to tax 
rates”.1 As Sialm (2006) points out, there has been a significant fluctuation in marginal 
income tax rates in United States from 1913 to 19992
This paper is the first attempt to include stochastic taxation in a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework with endogenous rates of time preference, even though there are 
many studies existing in both finance and public economics literature. For instance, 
Stiglitz (1982) discusses the welfare impacts of random taxation. According to Skinner 
(1988), “tax policy is often unpredictable because of factors beyond the control of 
government”. He shows the considerable variability of tax rates in US during the period 
1929-1975. By studying the additional excess burden of uncertain tax policy, he 
computes that uncertainty in tax policy led to $12 billion extra burden for the US 
economy in 1985. In addition, Hassett and Metcalf (1999) use a model with an uncertain 
investment tax credit to study the effects of tax policy uncertainty on aggregate 
investment. They find that, under a continuous time random walk, tax policy uncertainty 
causes a delay in investment. This result is also in line with the findings of Agliardi 
 which implies that there is tax 
policy uncertainty. 
                                                     
1Hassett and Metcalf (1999). 
 
2That is also valid for OECD countries. For more information see OECD tax database. 
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(2001). Yet, by extending Hassett and Metcalf's (1999) model, Bohm and Funke (2000) 
demonstrate that the effects of tax policy uncertainty must be very limited because of 
various modelling assumptions. 
On the other hand, recent literature on fiscal economics points towards the effects 
of different types of government spending versus tax shocks on GDP and its components. 
Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) investigate the effects of a change in 
fiscal policy on private investment using a panel of OECD countries. They find that taxes 
do have negative impact on output, as do Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Moreover, the 
latter concludes that private consumption increases follow an increase in tax rates. In both 
these studies, it is shown that any increase in taxes will crowd out private investment. In 
addition, Perotti (2004) points out that the impact of any change in tax policy on GDP 
and its components have become weaker over time. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) try to 
distinguish the effects of fiscal policy shocks for US economy between 1955-2000. 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature by focusing on the 
impacts of anticipated tax shocks under stochastically growing output, and stochastic tax 
shocks under deterministic output, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with 
endogenous rates of time preference. As pointed out above, the empirical studies indicate 
that tax rate changes are frequent and, in most cases, future tax changes cannot be 
predicted. This basically implies that tax changes can be an element of uncertainty. For 
instance, since the 1990s, there has been a tax competition in the sense that countries cut 
tax rates to attract investment which makes firms operate in a tax-cut scenario because of 
the possibility of further future reductions. Thus, whatever the sign of the tax rate change 
is, tax rate uncertainty is an important issue that must be analyzed (Fedele, Panteghini 
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and Vergalli, 2009). Or to put it differently, it is important to see how the agents react if 
there is an uncertainty about tax levels in the economy. It is worth noting that over the 
last two decades, most of the studies in the literature use either real option models to 
study the effects of tax rate uncertainty on investment or econometric/numerical 
techniques to see the impact and/or international transmission of any shock in an 
economy. Here, we deviate from these studies by setting up a stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium model to focus on the welfare effects of various capital tax instruments in a 
small open economy populated by infinitely-lived households possessing endogenous 
time preference that is in line with Epstein and Hynes (1983).3
 
 The model also assumes 
that the households can borrow or lend freely in the world capital market. Perfectly 
competitive firms produce one good that can be used for consumption and investment 
which is subject to adjustment costs in the sense that the firm has to pay an installation 
cost. We, then simulate the model and show that: (i) under a deterministic setup, a 
permanent expected increase in any of capital income tax will lead to a change in welfare 
that depends on whether the marginal productivity of capital exceeds or falls short of the 
real rate of interest; (ii) when output is stochastically growing, any increase in tax levels 
causes a decrease in welfare regardless of where the economy stands; (iii) when there is a 
stochastic change in tax levels, the change in welfare will depend on the change in the 
type of the capital income tax, in the sense that a stochastic negative change in corporate 
income tax and tax on capital gains will lead to an increase in welfare because of the 
increase in wealth. 
                                                     
3For empirical findings, also see Obstfeld (1990). 
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The model we present in the next section also predicts the effects of any change in 
tax levels on consumption, capital stock, shadow price of capital and the current account. 
Unlike most intertemporal equilibrium models, our model leads to non-monotonic 
adjustment of the current account in response to various policy changes. This finding 
implies that, if adjustment costs are beyond a certain threshold, there will be an initial 
decrease in both savings and investment when investment is at its lowest level. 
Thereafter, savings will increase parallel to low levels of disinvestment.4
There are three theoretical papers closely related to our paper in terms of the 
questions having light shined on them: Bizer and Judd (1989), Nielsen and Sorensen 
(1991) and Karayalcin (1995). Bizer and Judd (1995) made a seminal contribution by 
highlighting the uncertainty in tax policy under a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework by implementing Markov process. Their model is relatively straightforward 
since only two types of taxes (investment tax credit and income tax rate) are included. 
 
To examine the dynamic macroeconomic effects of capital income taxation, 
Nielsen and Sorensen (1991) develop a small open economy with perfect mobility of 
financial capital as possessing time-additive (exogenous) preference. Although various 
forms of capital income taxation are included in the model, the changes in taxes are 
deterministic. Therefore, here we depart from Nielsen and Sorensen (1991) in extending 
the model by including both endogenous time preference and adding a stochastic 
framework. The former is adopted because, if the constant-discount rate does not match 
with the parametric world interest rate, a stationary equilibrium does not exist. On the 
                                                     
4See Karayalcin (1994). 
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other hand, if that rate diverges from the parametric world interest rate, the time additive 
preferences will cause hysteretic adjustment towards the steady state5
Finally, by combining endogenous time preference and adjustment costs, 
Karayalcin (1995) builds a model that focuses on the welfare effects of capital tax 
instruments in a small open economy. In that framework, because of the adjustment costs, 
he ended up with a lower degree of consumption smoothing since agents will no longer 
be able to undertake a frictionless adjustment in the capital stock. Another significant 
difference is that his study concentrated on unanticipated tax shocks and their welfare 
effects. Here, we deviate from Karayalcin (1995) in enhancing the model by involving 
both stochastically growing output and stochastic taxation. Also, we differ from all three 
papers cited above by incorporating numerical analysis which measures the magnitudes 
of effects due to variation in capital income taxes. 
, rendering the 
analysis dependent on initial conditions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets up a model with 
stochastically growing output in a small open economy with perfect capital mobility of 
financial capital. The setup is one with infinitely-lived households possessing 
endogenous rate of time preference and adjustment costs in investment. The effects of 
changes in tax policy instruments will be studied in section three and section four 
concludes the paper.  
I.II.  The Model 
  Consider an economy that produces a single good that may be used for 
consumption as well as investment. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms produce in a 
                                                     
5 See Karayalcin (1995), Sen and Turnovsky (1990).  
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competitive market. The economy is populated by infinitely-lived households possessing 
endogenous time preferences. The number of households are normalized to one without 
loss of generality. Government collects taxes by following a balanced budget policy in 
the sense that the tax revenue is used to finance the households via transfers.  
Households 
  The welfare of households is taken to depend on consumption of the good in the 
market. Also, the households receive the wage tw  by inelastically supplying one unit of 
labor services per unit of time. We denote the world interest rate by r , the interest 
income tax rate by rt  and the household's net assets by ta , that is the sum of the value of 
domestic equity and the value of foreign assets. Thus, tr atr )(1−  is the net interest 
income. According to equations (1)-(3) below, the consumer is maximizes expected 
discounted lifetime welfare subject to the constraint that the current increase in non-
human wealth is equal to the sum of after tax income from wealth, from labor and from 
government transfers minus consumption. 
We also adopt the endogenous rate of time preference structure proposed by 
Epstein and Hynes (1983). Other than the time-additive models, in this setting, time 
preference imply a well-defined long-run target level. Therefore, lifetime welfare, U , is 
maximized over consumption path, C , by 
rt
zexpECU
r
t
t
t )(11
1)(=)(
0= −+
−− ∑
∞
  (1) 
subject to 
,)(=1 rcuzz ttt −−+   (2) 
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,)(1=1 ttttrtt tcwrataa −−+−−+   (3) 
0,=0z   (4) 
where 0>)(cu  is required to be a strictly increasing and strictly concave felicity function 
in the sense that 0>u′  and 0<u ′′  and tt  is the lump-sum government transfer. 
Following Obstfeld (1990) and Epstein and Hynes (1983), one can argue that the 
lifetime welfare functional U  deviates from the time-additive utility functionals by its 
recursivity. As is widely known, additivity implies that the marginal rate of substitution 
between times 1t  and 2t  is independent of consumption at any ,1tt ≠ 2t . However, here, 
recursivity allows this marginal rate of substitution to be independent of consumption 
before 1t  but not after 2t  in order to make future consumption weakly sepereable from 
past consumption levels. Therefore, the variable rate of time preference Ω  at time s  has 
the following form: 
.)(=
1
==
−
∞












−Ω ∑∑ s
t
vsvs
s cuexp   (5) 
 Ω  at time s  is the following function of the utility functional )(CU  
1=)( −−Ω ss φφ   (6) 
 and  
)(= CU ssφ   (7) 
where U  represents positive discounting of future consumption and sφ  denotes aggregate 
future consumption (or lifetime welfare at time s). It should be noted that the rate of time 
preference is not constant as will be the case in the additive model. On the other hand, as 
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in the steady state, if the consumption path is globally constant, tt cc =1+  for all t  and 
cct = . In this case, the rate of time preference is given by 
)(=)( cuφΩ   (8) 
 where upper-bars describe long-run equilibrium. 
Even though there is significant dispute on whether impatience to consume has to 
increase or decrease as current consumption goes up, since it is assumed that 0>)(cu′ , in 
our framework increasing marginal impatience will take place as in Lucas and Stokey 
(1984) who basically emphasize that a kind of diminishing private returns to saving is 
required to have local stability. Therefore, the felicity function is specialized to: 
ω+tt lnccu =)(   (9) 
where ω  stands for a parameter to measure generalized time preference. 
By using equations (1-4) and (9), the standard solution of the life-time welfare 
maximization problem yields: 
[ ] .)(1)(1=)( 1 ttrtt crtcE φΩ−+−+   (10) 
On the other hand, by differentiating (1) with respect to time, we can obtain the 
dynamics of lifetime welfare: 
1),)((1=)( 1 +++ tttt cuE φφ   (11) 
Firms 
  Competitive firms employ capital, tk , and labor to produce the single good 
which is used for both consumption and investment. The production function is 
αθ t
y
tt kkf =)(   (12) 
9 
 
where ytθ  is the aggregate productivity shock which follows a stochastic autoregressive 
process6 tε with the disturbance term  assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance 2yσ  i.e. )(0,
2
yt N σε : . 
We assume that the firm finances a fraction )(1 ε−  of new investment by debt 
issues and the remaining fraction, ε , by retained earnings as: 
t
c
t kb )(1= ε−   (13) 
and  
))((1= 11 tt
c
t
c
t kkbb −−− ++ ε   (14) 
After corporate income tax is applied, the remaining profits are distributed as 
dividends to equity holders. Therefore, before personal tax, total dividends, tπ , are: 
[ ] tlttcctttt itbbtTrbwkf )(1)(1)(= 1 −−−+−−−− +π   (15) 
 where ct  and lt  stand for the corporate income tax rate and the rate of investment tax 
credit respectively and T  denotes the adjustment cost. If the firm changes its capital, it is 
subject to adjustment costs in the sense that the firm has to pay a deadweight installation 
cost other than the actual cost si . The installation cost
7
i
 must be an increasing function of 
 in relation to k , which should have the following properties: 
0.>)/(2,0>0,=(0) TkiTTT ′′+′′    (16) 
 
  
                                                     
6The details can be seen in the next section. 
 
7Note that adjustment cost depends on gross investment rather than net investment. Yet, since we ignore 
depreciation, those terms can be treated as same.  
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In our framework, the installation cost function is specialized to       
)//2)((=)/( tttt kikiT χ  so that, in order to increase the capital stock by i  units, the 
representative firm needs to pay [ ])//2)((1 ttt kii χ+  units of output. 
Foreign bonds, ftb , and corporate bonds, 
c
tb , are treated to be perfect substitutes. 
Thus, they have to pay the same expected after tax return. If tV  denotes the market value 
of outstanding equity, rt  stands for the personal interest income tax rate and gt  is the 
capital gains tax rate, for all t  the arbitrage condition therefore will be: 
[ ]
t
tttg
t
t
r V
VVEt
V
tr
−−
+− +
)()(1
=)(1 1π    (17) 
where the term on the left-hand side is the after tax income on foreign bonds, whereas the 
right-hand side delineates the after tax equity return, consisting of current yield and 
capital gains. The market value of equity at time zero will therefore be: 
1
1
)(
1=
=
−
−
∞








+∑
s
rg
g
ssg
s
ss r
EV
θθ
θ
πθ
                               
(18) 
where ji t−1=θ , rgcj ,,= . Firms choose to maximize the present discounted value of 
sV  subject to the constraint sss kki −+1= . The solution yields, 












+−−−
+
+
+
+
+
++ )()()(1))((
)(
=)(
1
1'2
1
1
1
'
1
s
s
s
s
sss
g
c
g
grs
ss k
iT
k
iErkfE
rq
qE ε
θ
θ
θ
θθ
     (19) 






++− )()(()(1= '2
s
s
s
s
cl
g
s k
iT
k
iTtq θε
θ
  (20) 
ssss kkfkfw )()(=
'−   (21) 
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where the shadow price of capital at time s  is given by sq . Following Hayashi (1982), 
we can define sq  as the ratio of market value of firm's equity to the replacement cost of 
capital. Thus, sq  in equaation (20) can be considered as a variant of Tobin's Q. Equation 
(21) is the equilibrium condition for the labor market while the law of motion for the 
shadow price of capital is given by equation (19). 
Equation (20) can be used to denote the rate of investment, tt ki / , as the following 
function of tq : 
)(== 1 ttttt qkkki γ−+   (22) 
where 0.>)/(=)(' χθθγ cgtq  Equation (22) simply expresses investment as an increasing 
function of the shadow value of capital, tq . Here, it should be noted that both q  and i  
are independent of the consumption and saving decisions of the households.  
The Current Account 
 In this part, by recalling the government's balanced budget policy, in order to 
acquire the dynamics of the current account, let us use equations (3), (15)-(22) and 
c
ttt
f
tt bkqba ++= . We therefore obtain 
ttt
f
t
f
t
f
t cTikfrbbb −+−+−+ )(1)(=1   (23) 
which states that the increase in foreign asset holdings equals the difference between the 
sum of output and interest earnings of the representative household less the sum of 
consumption and investment expenditures.  
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Characterization of the Equilibrium 
It is convenient to describe the economy's steady state before characterizing the 
equilibrium behavior of our model. The market clearance and optimality conditions will 
give the long-run relations in this economy. We can easily obtain the steady state value of 
the shadow price of capital, q , by using equations (19) and (22), and imposing the 
stationarity conditions. At steady state  
0,<0,>),,(=,= *2
*
1
* qqttqqtq lg
g
l
θ
ε −   (24) 
where, in order to guarantee a positive value of q , it is assumed that the replacement cost 
of capital is higher than the debt issue per unit of capital, lt−− 1<1 ε , which indicates 
that the firm does not overfinance its investment.8
Similarly, it yields
 
9
),,,,(=)()(1=)( * lrcg
gc
lr ttttkktrkf







 −
+−′
θθ
εθ
ε
 
  
0,>0,>0,<0,< *4
*
3
*
2
*
1 kkkk     (25) 
),,,,(=)(= * lrcg
f
ttttbbkfcbr −      0,<0,<0,>0,>
*
4
*
3
*
2
*
1 bbbb  (26) 
0,<),(=,=)(
'** ctccrcu rrθ   (27) 
0<),(=,1=
'** φφφ
θ
φ r
r
t
r 






−
 
 (28) 
 
                                                     
8For more information, see Nielsen and Sorensen (1991). 
 
9The derivatives can be seen in appendix. 
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Thus, one can obtain the steady state values of q( , k , b , c , φ ) by using 
equations (24)-(28). 
Since we do have the steady state values of all the variables, it is convenient to 
follow Schmitt-Grohe (2005) and solve our system by perturbation methods. Before 
doing so, let us briefly discuss this method. The first-order perturbation method is similar 
to linearization of the Euler equations around steady state. Essentially, with the help of 
the techniques for forward looking rational expectations, the linear model is solved. One 
of the main requirements we need to satisfy is the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) condition: that 
is the number of the roots larger than 1 in modulus has to match the number of forward 
looking variables in the model.10
),,( bk yθ
 Or, to put it differently, for the system to be locally 
saddlepath stable, it has to be the case that three of the eigenvalues have to be larger than 
1 in modulus, since the system has three predetermined (backward looking)  and 
three control (foreward looking) variables ),,( qc φ . It is straightforward to show that this 
is the case here.  
I.III. Various Fiscal Shocks and Their Effects on Economy 
 In this section, we examine the outcomes of the model under different types of 
shocks. Before moving onto that part, although actual tax systems differ, let us define the 
case where rg tt =  and 0== lc tt ; in other words, an economy under a uniform, 
comprehensive income tax, no investment subsidies and with fully integrated corporation 
taxes. Therefore, in this case  we  will end up with rkf =)(′  equivalence  confirming the  
 
                                                     
10For details, see Judd (1998), Sims (2002), Judd (1996) Kim and Kim (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2004) and Collard and Juillard (2001). 
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Schanz-Haig-Simons result which argues for the neutrality of income tax with respect to 
investment. 
Yet, in a real world tax system, q  and k  will be affected by tax factors because 
generally neither the investment tax credit is equal to zero, and nor is the effective tax 
rate on interest earnings less than the tax rate on accrued capital gains. Thus, there occurs 
a distortionary wedge between the world interest rate and the marginal productivity of 
capital in the home country. Suppose, initially, that the former exceeds the latter. In this 
case, any policy that shrinks the home capital stock will, by increasing its marginal 
productivity, reduce the distortion and raise lifetime welfare. Thus, in order both to 
analyze our model more concretely and to investigate the outcomes of different scenarios 
more profoundly, two countries, Canada and Sweden, are included. Among our countries, 
Canada represents the rkf <)(′  case, whereas Sweden embodies rkf >)(′  case given 
the initial values. 
Deterministic Tax Shocks and Their Effects on Welfare 
Since the welfare effect is going to play an important role in the next section, in 
order to be able to compare and contrast, we will start out considering the effects of an 
expected permanent increase in the corporate income tax rate. As seen in equation (25), 
this will reduce the long-run capital stock of the economy and therefore the effect on 
consumption on impact will be positive. However, since the long-run foreign asset 
holdings increase, there is expected to be an increase in savings as well, which causes a 
negative effect on consumption on impact. The net effect is determined by the inital 
condition of the economy i.e whether rkf >)(′  or rkf <)(′ . Following Karayalcin 
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(1995), we can infer that φ  on impact yields the present discounted value of the future 
felicity stream as of time 0=t . Thus, the difference between φ  on impact and initial φ  
is a measure of the welfare effects of the policies under consideration. To summarize, if, 
initially rkf >)(′ , we can expect a drop in consumption on impact so will lifetime 
welfare because the decline in capital stock caused by the rise in ct  will accentuate the 
distortion by increasing the marginal product of capital. 
Figures (1.1)-(1.4) show the simulation results for an increase in ct  and gt  both 
for Canada and Sweden. We find that under an expected permanent increase in the 
corporate income tax or tax on capital gains, lifetime welfare increases in Canada, 
whereas Sweden will suffer from the rise in taxes due to the reasons mentioned above. To 
place the discussion in a familiar setting, let us examine the Canadian, rkf <)(′ , case. 
An expected permanent rise in the corporate income tax11
r
 will cause an increase in 
welfare. This is mainly because of the required long-run decrease in the domestic capital 
stock and the long-run increase in foreign asset holdings. If the interest earned on foreign 
bonds, , is less than the long-run effect of the decline in the capital stock on income 
)<)(..( rkfei ′ , the decrease in the capital stock caused by the rise in ct  will reduce the 
distortion and increase lifetime welfare.12
Let us turn to the effects of an increase in the investment tax credit. As seen in 
equation (26), there will be a decrease in long-run foreign asset holding and a rise on the 
 
                                                     
11Same result is valid for the tax on capital gains. 
 
12On the other hand, if rkf >)(′  initially holds, an increase in ct  will give rise to a fall in capital stock 
which will accentuate the distortion and reduce lifetime welfare. 
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long-run capital stock because of the decline in the replacement cost of capital for both 
countries. Thus, for Canada, the distortion will be accentuated and there will be a 
decrease in welfare on impact as seen in figures (1.5) and (1.6). On the other hand, since 
rkf >)(′  holds for Sweden, the lifetime welfare will increase because of the reduction in 
the distortion. 
Finally, we will consider the effects of a rise in the tax rate on interest income, .rt  
Such a policy will make ownership of real capital more attractive relative to the 
ownership of bonds. Thus, there is expected to be an increase in the long-run level of 
capital and a decrease in the steady state level of foreign asset holdings. It should also be 
noted that the increase in k  will take place until the equity price returns to its initial 
level.13
rkf <)(′
 As can be seen in figure (1.8), lifetime welfare increases in Sweden because of 
the rise in capital stock which will reduce the distortion. On the other hand, as the 
increase in tax rate discussed above indicate, if initially  holds, the same policy 
will accentuate the distortion and reduce lifetime welfare.  
Mixed Shocks and The Model 
In this section14
 
, we begin analyzing the model under a stochastic productivity 
shock and considering that model as the benchmark. Thereafter, the shocks will be mixed 
in the  sense  that  the  stochastic  productivity  shock  will  be kept  while  the anticipated  
                                                     
13The details can be seen in the next section. 
 
14It should be noted that the same stochastic productivity shock remains throughout this part although its 
level is kept small in order to avoid any outweighing effect in the sense that productivity shock never 
dominates the tax shock. Thus, it must be considering while evaluating the results.  
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permanent tax shocks will be added to see how the model reacts if agents began 
expecting higher tax rates. 
In a stochastic framework, since the model needs to be made stationary around a 
steady state, permanent shocks cannot be placed. Moreover, shocks can only hit the 
system today and the expectation of future shocks has to be zero. However, by adding a 
latent shock variable (which has a normal distribution with zero mean), tε , it is possible 
to make the effect of the shock disperse slowly throughout the economy. Here, basically, 
tε  is going to affect the model's true exogenous variable 
y
tθ  that is itself an AR(1) 
process (Griffoli, 2007). 
t
y
t
y
t ερθθ +−1=   (29) 
Our results suggest that, under stochastically growing output any increase in tax 
level will worsen the economy and reduce welfare regardless of whether rkf )(′ . For 
both countries, the results are in tables (1.1) and (1.2) and the impulse response analyses 
can be seen in figures (1.11)-(1.18). 
We first discuss the simulation results when there is only a stochastic productivity 
shock. Figure (1.9) shows the results for Canada and figure (1.10) for Sweden. For both 
countries, our indicators show a similar trend in adjustment path when hit by a stochastic 
productivity shock. A 1% standard error increase in tε  causes an increase in capital as 
well as consumption in the short run. The former is caused by the increase in the 
marginal product of capital whereas the latter is a result of an increase in output. On the 
other hand, there will be an increase in the rate of return on equity that leads to an 
immediate jump in the price of equity q, which will stimulate investment by causing a 
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current account deficit. Since c  jumps on impact as well, domestic absorption will 
increase which deteriorates the current account deficit in the short run. However, in the 
long run, investment starts to decrease along with the decrease in q  which causes an 
improvement in current account balance. In addition, consumption adjusts much faster 
than the investment level. Thus, the accentuating effect of consumption on current 
account will die out, or, to put it differently, the current account balance will improve in 
the long-run by adjusting non-monotonically. 
Next, as discussed above, we will mix the stochastic productivity shock and 
anticipated permanent tax shocks. In analyzing table 1.1, let us start out considering the 
effects of a foreseen rise in the corporate income tax rate under stochastic productivity 
shocks. Suppose the government announces that a corporate tax will be implemented at 
time 20=t . Anticipating a future reduction in the rate of return on equity, investors will 
decrease their demand for equity which will cause a drop in the price of equity q  on 
impact along with a process of capital decumulation. It should be noted that, considering 
equation (22), as q  remains below its long-run level along the adjustment path, 
investment will decrease. In the short-run, the decline in the rate of investment along with 
the reduction in consumption will improve current account balance. Yet, in the long-run, 
investment will increase to reach its long-run value in addition to a decline in savings that 
leads to a deterioration in the current account balance as in both figure (1.11) and (1.12). 
Therefore, the current account will adjust non-monotonically. 
Under stochastic productivity shock, a foreseen increase in capital gains tax rate, 
gt , will increase long-run foreign asset holdings and reduce the long-run domestic capital 
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stock as well as lead to a rise in the long-run equity price q . Notice that the long-run 
changes in k  and q , by putting opposing pressures on impact, determine the short-run 
adjustment of q . Although there is a jump in q  on impact, there will be follow a process 
of capital decumulation, or, to put it differently, a decrease in investment occurs because 
of the increase in gt  which clearly outweighs the jump in q .
15
Conversely, under stochastic productivity shocks, an anticipated future increase in 
 Afterwards, the capital 
stock will adjust to its new long-run level by giving rise to an increase in real investment. 
On the other hand, consumption drops on impact by strengthening the improving effects 
of decreasing investment on current account. Thus, current account will have an upward 
trend until the increasing effects of higher savings die out. Afterwards, the current 
account surplus starts to decrease along with an increase in investment and adjusts to its 
new steady-state level (see figures 1.13 and 1.14). 
lt  has an expansionary long-run effect because the investment tax credit decreases the 
effective price of new capital goods relative to initial capital. Therefore, the long-run 
level of k  will increase, whereas there will be a decline in the steady state level of 
foreign asset holdings. As in the case of an increase in gt , there will be opposing 
pressures on the equity price q . On the other hand, because of the anticipated reduction 
in the effective price of new capital goods, a foreseen future tax credit is expansionary 
from the time it is expected until the time it takes effect. As is well-known, a higher rate 
of investment tax credit makes new capital cheaper relative to initial capital. Thus, there 
will be an increase in the domestic capital stock up until the implementation of new tax 
                                                     
15See equation (35) in appendix. 
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policy. To summarize, analyzing figures (1.15) and (1.16), we can say that capital stock 
per capita is increasing from the time of announcement of the new tax policy until the 
time it takes effect, whereas a contraction occurs after the new tax policy is introduced. 
On the other hand, as opposed to the case of an increase in gt , we see an immediate jump 
in consumption on impact which will aggravate the domestic absorption, worsening the 
current account deficit. As the economy starts to increase its holdings of foreign assets 
(right after implementing the new tax levels), it has to run a current account surplus 
which implies a nonmonotonic adjustment of the current account balance. 
Finally, let us examine the effects of a foreseen rise in the personal interest 
income tax rate, rt , under a stochastic productivity shock. Note that an anticipated rise in 
the tax rate on interest income will lead to a higher demand for equity since there will be 
a reduction in the rate of return on foreign bonds. The excess stock demand for equity 
will be eliminated by an immediate jump in the price of q  on impact. As a result, real 
investment will rise as q  remains above its long-run level. Yet, as capital intensity rises 
we see that its marginal product declines, up until q  and the rate of investment go back to 
their long-run values. On the other hand, since a rise in rt  will reduce the long-run utility 
target, households will reduce their long-run consumption. As a consequence, current 
account balance will deteriorate because of the rise in both investment and consumption 
levels. However, consumption will reach its steady state value sooner, and therefore, the 
accentuating effects of higher consumption on current account will disappear in parallel 
to the reduction in investment. Thus, there again occurs a non-monotonic adjustment of 
current account balance. 
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Last but not least, we will highlight the impacts of any changes in tax levels under 
stochastically growing output on welfare. Since the logic is, mutatis mutandis, same for 
the rest of the exercises, we will examine the effects of an increase in the tax rate on 
capital gains and investment tax credit. As seen in table 1.2, an increase in tax rate on 
capital gains will lead to a decrase in the long-run domestic capital stock and an increase 
in foreign asset holdings. Because of the reasons discussed in the previous part of the 
chapter, this change in tax level is expected to give rise to a reduction in lifetime welfare 
if, initially, rkf >)(′ . On the other hand, there will be an increase in welfare if rkf <)(′  
initially holds. However, here, for both of the countries, consumption drops on impact, so 
will lifetime welfare which is because of the uncertainty and the risk averse utility 
function.16
φ
 When the effects of output shocks propogate over time, a risk averse utility 
function will lead to a cost called the cost of uncertainty. That is mainly why we ended up 
with the following: It is clear from table 1.1 and 1.2 that on impact consumption levels 
(so will lifetime welfare) are lower than the benchmark cases. On the other hand, an 
increase in the investment tax credit has an expansionary long-run effect on domestic 
capital stock and a contractionary long-run effect on foreign asset holdings. Therefore, a 
reduction in life-time welfare is expected for Canada whereas a rise in life-time welfare is 
anticipated for Sweden. However, in this case, although there is a jump on impact, life-
time welfare reduces for both of the countries -when compared to the benchmark- 
regardless of where the economy stands. For instance, the on impact value of  is -14.75 
and -16.92 for Canada and Sweden respectively (see table 1.1). Yet, as a response to a 
                                                     
16Risk aversion simply implies that individuals strictly prefer to take the expected value of a lottery to than 
the lottery itself.  
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change in various type of tax instruments, in none of the cases, we are able to have a 
higher φ  on impact value. Thus, under stochastically growing output, a welfare paradox 
does not exist.  
The Stochastic Tax Shocks and Their Effects 
 In this part, we will put the model to work by considering the effects of stochastic 
tax shocks.17
δ
 With having the following structure, we assume that the economy has been 
experiencing a deterministic tax structure and expects it to last forever. Then, we change 
the tax policy by introducing some uncertainty but keeping the mean tax rate constant 
after an initial decrease in tax levels. For this purpose, we have 's such that tzj
i
t eθδ =  
where rlgcj ,,,=  and tz  is the tax shock which follows a stochastic autoregressive 
process ttt zz ζµ +−1=  with the disturbance term tζ  assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean zero and variance 2zσ  i.e. )(0,
2
zt N σζ : . As in the case of stochastic 
productivity shock discussed above, similarly, here we do shock the system today by 
dispersing its effect slowly throughout the economy. It is worth noting that an increase in 
i
tδ  on impact means a reduction in tax levels. Thus, throughout this part, the shocks 
hitting the system today are negative tax shocks. 
Let us start out by considering the effects of a stochastic change in the corporation 
tax. On impact, this will increase dividends and the rate of return on equity. The 
expectations of capital gains will rise and there will be an immediate jump in the price of 
equity, q , leads to an immediate increase in investment which will cause a current 
                                                     
17Throughout this part, productivity parameter is normalized to one without loss of generality. In other 
words, productivity is constant. 
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account deficit.18 c Since  jumps on impact, we will end up with an increase in domestic 
absorption which accentuates the current account deficit in the short run. Towards steady 
state, this process reverses and continues until the rate of return on foreign bonds equal 
the rate of return on equity. In other words, right after an initial jump in q , investment 
starts to decrease along with the shrink in q  which causes an improve on current account 
balance. Moreover, consumption adjusts much quicker, or, to put it differently, the 
accentuating effect of higher consumption on current account will disappear. Therefore, 
in the long-run, that will improve the current account balance as well, besides the shrink 
in investment. 
Next, consider the effects of a stochastic change in the capital gains tax. As 
opposed to the previous case, here, what we see is an initial drop in q  along with an 
increase in domestic capital stock. We can explain this situation by combining19
gθ
 
equations (18) and (19). Depending on the corresponding equation, a decrease in capital 
gains tax rate, , will lead to a decrease in q  on impact. However, although we expect 
(and also see) an increase in investment level, here, q  declines. This situation can be 
explained by equation (22) which basically indicates that the change in gθ  outweighs the 
decline in q  and therefore, even though q  drops on impact, there is an increase in the 
invesment level. In the short-run, an increase in the rate of investment along with an 
increase in consumption will deteriorate current account balance. On the other hand, in 
                                                     
18It should also be noted in figure 1.19 that k  rises/declines as soon as q  exceeds/falls behind its steady 
state value. 
 
19The corresponding equation can be seen in appendix. 
 
24 
 
the long-run, the accentuating effect of c  on current account will disappear in addition to 
the decrease in investment that leads to an improve in current account balance as seen in 
figure 1.20. 
Conversely, a stochastic change in invesment tax credit causes a jump in q  on 
impact. Yet, here, investment is decreasing in the short-run which can be explained by 
equation (20). It is straightforward in the equation that we will end up a decrease in 
investment level at least in the short-run because the change in lt  has a dominating effect 
on the increase in q . Therefore, k  goes up in the medium-run. However, since the shock 
on lt  dies out over time, towards steady state the increase in q  offsets the change in 
investment tax credit which will give rise to an increase in k  (so will investment). The 
decrease in investment, along with declining consumption, will improve current account 
balance in the short-run. However, in the long-run, consumption will adjust before 
domestic capital stock. Thus, the improving effect of higher savings on current account 
will disappear in conjuction with the increase in investment level causing a deterioration 
in current account balance. Here, again, this implies a non-monotonic adjustment of the 
current account (see figure 1.21). 
Finally, let us consider the effects of a stochastic change in the tax rate on 
personal interest income. It should be noted that, initially, the rate of return on foreign 
bonds will increase. On impact, there will be a decrease on demand for equity, which will 
be absorbed by an immediate drop in the price of equity which increases the yield on it. 
In the medium run, the investment will decrease caused by the reduction in domestic 
capital stock. Therefore, the marginal productivity of capital will decrease up until the 
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equity price, q , and the investment level will reach their initial levels in the long-run. On 
the other hand, since there is a drop in consumption on impact and a decrease in the rate 
of investment in the short run, the current account balance will improve. However, again, 
that process reverses in the long-run, indicating a deterioration in the current account 
balance before it reaches its long-run level, or, to put it differently, an implication of a 
non-monotonic adjustment of the current account. 
Next, we will briefly point out the welfare impacts of stochastic tax changes. As 
seen from figures (1.19) to (1.22), while a stochastic change in corporate income tax and 
the tax rate on capital gains cause an increase in consumption on impact (so will welfare), 
a stochastic change in investment tax credit and the tax rate on personal interest income 
lead to a drop in welfare. Here, since long run values do not change, we need to provide 
an alternative explanation. As known, wealth is roughly equal to .qk  Thus, an increase in 
wealth level will give rise to an increase in consumption level which will also cause an 
increase in welfare. For instance, it is obvious from figure (1.19) that, as a response to a 
stochastic corporation tax shock, both k  and most of the time q  remains above their 
steady-state level that makes individuals wealthier and leads to a rise in consumption. On 
the other hand, the opposite holds for a stochastic interest income tax shock. As a 
response to a capital gains tax shock, while k  stays above its long-run level because of 
the reasons explained above, q  is below its steady state level. Here we can conclude that 
the increase in domestic capital stock, k , outweighs the decline in q . Thus, consumption 
increases since there is an increase in wealth level.20
                                                     
20Again, the opposite holds for a stochastic investment tax credit shock. 
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I.4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the dynamic macroeconomic effects of different 
capital income taxation methods in a model of a small open economy with endogenous 
recursive time preferences and adjustment costs in investment where perfectly 
competitive firms produce one good that can be used for consumption and investment. 
We have shown the adjustment paths of consumption, lifetime welfare, equity prices, 
current account and investment in response to various tax shocks. Our results suggest that 
welfare paradoxes may exist only under deterministic output and anticipated tax shocks. 
Unlike most intertemporal equilibrium models, our model leads to non-monotonic 
adjustment of the current account in response to various policy changes. 
Our model can be generalized in numerous ways. For instance, it is worthwhile to 
generalize to see the outcomes of any change in tax policy or, in other words, how the tax 
policy might be adjusted in an economy. It may also be interesting to enhance our 
analysis by allowing the households to supply their labor elastically to study the impact 
of tax policy changes on wages and consumption. Our model can also be extended to a 
two-country framework to analyze the international transmission of shocks.  
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Table 1.1. Foreseen Tax Shocks under Stochastically Growing Output and Their Impacts 
(Sweden) 
 
 
 
Note: + above a variable indicates on impact value for the parameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2. Foreseen Tax Shocks under Stochastically Growing Output and Their Impacts 
(Canada) 
 
 
Note: + above a variable indicates on impact value for the parameter. 
 
  
A rise in
tc 0.4587 -48.07 0.9285 25.98 -61.78 0.4405 -60.46
tg 0.4587 -48.07 0.9352 26.18 -61.96 0.4054 -84.17
tl 0.4587 -48.07 0.9 27.29 -62.98 0.496 -22.93
tr 0.4585 -49.01 0.9285 26.95 -62.67 0.4713 -40.76
0.4587 -48.07 0.9285 26.39 -62.15 0.5047 -16.92
Benchmark for Sweden
A rise in
tc 0.4617 -36.76 0.7971 23.58 -59.4 0.4408 -46.07
tg 0.4617 -36.76 0.8092 23.54 -59.36 0.4122 -58.79
tl 0.4617 -36.76 0.7681 24.95 -60.73 0.4855 -26.2
tr 0.4615 -37.3 0.7971 24.33 -60.14 0.4822 -28.25
0.4617 -36.76 0.7971 23.94 -59.76 0.5112 -14.75
Benchmark for Canada
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Figure 1.1. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in corporate income tax for Canada 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in capital gains tax for Canada 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in corporate income tax for Sweden 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in capital gains tax for Sweden 
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Figure 1.5. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in investment tax credit for Canada 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in investment tax credit for Sweden 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in interest income tax for Canada
 
 
 
Figure 1.8. The welfare effect of a 3% increase in interest income tax for Sweden 
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Figure 1.9. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic productivity shock for Canada.  
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic productivity shock for Sweden.  
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state.  
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Figure 1.11. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tc under stochastically growing output for 
Canada. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.12. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tc under stochastically growing output for 
Sweden. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
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Figure 1.13. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tg under stochastically growing output for 
Canada. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.14. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tg under stochastically growing output for 
Sweden. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
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Figure 1.15. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tl under stochastically growing output for 
Canada. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.16. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tl under stochastically growing output for 
Sweden. 
 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
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Figure 1.17. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tr under stochastically growing output for 
Canada. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.18. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare after a 1% increase in tr under stochastically growing output for 
Sweden. 
 
Note: Dotted lines in any figure indicate 90% confidence interval around the mean 
trajectory.  
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Figure 1.19. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic corporation tax shock.  
 
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.20. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic capital gains tax shock.  
 
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state. 
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Figure 1.21. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic investment tax credit shock.  
 
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.22. The transient paths of consumption, equity price, capital stock, current 
account and welfare following a stochastic interest income tax shock.  
 
 
Note: Figure depicts the deviations from steady-state. 
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CHAPTER II 
RETHINKING THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON 
MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES 
II.I. Introduction 
A common approach in both empirical and theoretical studies on fiscal policy 
shocks is to evaluate the response of macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous changes in 
the fiscal policy variables. From a theoretical point of view, the impacts of discretionary 
fiscal policy on the economy hinge on a number of key assumptions. For instance, in 
examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy, the presence or absence of 
forward-looking behavior plays a crucial role in that if agents do not look forward, 
expected future changes do not have any effect on current-period decisions. Agents with 
rational expectations, on the other hand, do look forward in anticipation of future changes 
in key macroeconomic variables.  
The empirical evidence, however, does not provide a clear picture of the effects of 
fiscal policy. In particular, even though the most recent and standard strand of the 
literature, which started with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), shows positive short-term 
output multipliers resulting from government expenditure increases and tax cuts, the 
estimated size and duration of these effects vary across studies. In fact, the magnitude of 
the multiplier may depend on the specification and/or sample period employed. 
Interestingly, there is even evidence of negative government spending multipliers for 
Australia, Canada and the UK for some sub-sample periods (Perotti, 2004).  
There is a substantial body of literature devoted to the effects of fiscal policy on 
key macroeconomic indicators using Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models. 
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For instance, Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) investigated the effects 
of a change in fiscal policy on private investment using a panel of OECD countries. Their 
finding that increases in taxes have a negative impact on output is parallel to the findings 
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).21
Both of these studies demonstrate that any increase in taxes will reduce private 
investment. Further, Perotti (2004) points out that the impact of any change in tax policy 
on GDP and its components becomes weaker over time. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) try 
to distinguish the effects of fiscal policy shocks for the US economy between 1955 and 
2000. They envisage three different scenarios: a deficit-financed spending increase, a 
balanced budget spending increase, and a deficit-financed tax cut. They conclude that 
among these three scenarios the deficit-financed tax cut is the most efficient one to help 
raise the gross domestic product. More recently, by employing a new database, Burriel et 
al. (2010) analyze the effect of fiscal policy for the US economy and Euro area as a 
whole. They find that GDP and inflation increase in response to government spending 
shocks even though the output multipliers are very similar and steadily increasing after 
2000, possibly because of the “global saving glut,” in both areas. 
 In addition, the latter concludes that private 
consumption increases following an increase in tax rates.  
Alternatively, Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2009) and Ramey (2007) report a 
decrease in unemployment in response to a positive spending shock. On the other hand, a 
few studies consider the reaction of the real wage  following  an  increase  in  government  
 
                                                     
21 For a detailed discussion, see also Fatas and Mihov (2001), Tenhofen and Wollf (2007), De Castro and 
De Cos (2008), Mertens and Ravn (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010). 
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spending. Among those, Pappa (2009) documents an increase whereas Burnside et al. 
(2004) report a decrease in the real wage in response to an expansionary fiscal policy. 
Some of the stylized facts above appear to contradict either neo-classical theory, 
real business cycle (RBC) model or the Keynesian approach. In other words, the sign and 
magnitude of the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates often 
offers opposite conclusions. For instance, following a positive government spending 
shock, New Keynesian theory tends to predict an increase in output, real wages and 
interest rate and a decrease in consumption and private investment. Yet in RBC models, 
the expansionary fiscal policy will lead to a decrease in real wages and an increase in 
private investment.  
Additionally, economic theory suggests that different forms of taxation have 
different impacts in macroeconomic activity. For instance, Barro (1990) points out that 
while non-productive expenditures financed by a distortionary tax have an 
unambiguously negative growth effect, non-distortionary tax-financed increases in 
productive expenditures are predicted to have a positive impact upon the growth rate. 
Baxter and King (1993) point out that financing government spending with lump-sum 
taxes and distortionary taxes have different effects on economy. Gordon et al. (2004 and 
2004a) analyze the impact on revenue and costs of a substantial change in fiscal policy, 
such as the effects of switching from capital income taxation to consumption-based tax 
system. They both find that consumption taxes and income taxes have different impacts 
on saving and investment decisions.  
In view of these discrepancies, the central message of this paper is that different 
tax groups have different effects on macroeconomic aggregates, depending on the 
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underlying cause of the tax increase. Our results suggest that analyzing the fiscal policy 
by decomposing total net taxes and examining their effect on the aggregate economy 
provide a more accurate picture than treating total net taxes as the fiscal policy variable. 
To this end, under the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification scheme, a five-variable 
VAR model, which includes total government spending, total net taxes, GDP, a measure 
of inflation and the interest rate is used as a benchmark for Canada, France, the UK and 
the United States. Thereafter, I propose a structural decomposition of total net taxes into 
four components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social 
insurance taxes. The paper provides estimates of the responses of macroeconomic 
aggregates to innovations in different tax groups by replacing total net taxes with each tax 
components separately. In a further step, the responses of the GDP components, private 
investment and consumption, to a shock to each tax component will be examined.  
Decompositions of total net tax innovations will help us assess the 
macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy shocks for four major economies with 
different economic structures. In this context, corporate income tax shocks, for instance, 
will have a very different impact on macroeconomic indicators than an indirect tax 
innovation. It is, therefore, important that we understand the extent to which increases in 
net taxes are driven by one shock or another, before concerning ourselves possible policy 
responses.   
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) 
decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components have different 
impacts on economic variables; 2) the size and persistence of these effects vary across 
countries  depending upon the strength  of  wealth, substitution, and income effects 
41 
 
reflecting the structure of the economies; 3) positive tax multipliers reported in previous 
studies are found only for the corporate income tax in the US, Canada, and France and for 
the social security tax in the US; 4) while we find that private investment is crowded out 
both by taxation and government spending in the UK and the US as consistent with the 
neo-classical model, our results for France and partially for Canada, indicate that there 
are opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private investment in line with 
Keynesian theory; and 5) private consumption is crowded in by government spending for 
all countries except the UK and crowded out by taxation in all countries except France. 
While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line with 
neo-classical theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two focuses on the 
identification of the structural shocks, specification and data describing. Section three 
investigates the impacts of the shocks identified in Section two on macroeconomic 
aggregates of four countries. Section four provides some concluding remarks 
I.II. Econometric Methodology and Data: 
The Identification Strategy 
Our identification strategy follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Denoting the 
vector of endogenous variables by Xt and the vector of reduced form residuals by Ut, the 
reduced form VAR can be represented as Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + Ut  (1) 
where Xt is a N x 1 vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a N x N matrix lag 
polynomial, and Ut is a N x 1 vector of reduced-form innovations which are assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed with covariance matrix  equal to the identity 
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matrix. In our benchmark specification Xt and Ut consist of the following variables: Xt = [gt, Tt, yt, pt, rt]′ and Ut = [utg, utT, uty, utp, utr]′.  
I start by expressing the reduced form innovations of the government spending 
and net taxes equations as linear combinations of the structural fiscal shocks etgand etT to 
these variables and the innovations of the other reduced form equations of the VAR, 
namely:  uty, utp and uti . This leads to the following formal representation of the reduced 
form residuals: utT = αyTuty + αpTutp + αiTutr + βgTetg + etT   (2) utg = αyguty + αpgutp + αigutr + βTgetT + etg  (3) 
As mentioned by Perotti (2004), in this framework, the coefficients αji measure 
both the automatic response of fiscal variable i to the macroeconomic variable j and the 
systematic discretionary response of fiscal variable i to the macroeconomic variable j. 
The coefficients βji capture the random discretionary fiscal policy shocks to fiscal 
policies; these are the “structural” fiscal shocks. It should also be noted that we avoid 
using the Cholesky decomposition method. Regardless of the order of fiscal variables, 
Cholesky orthogonalization will not provide consistent estimates of the structural shocks 
if, as is the case here, the αjk’s are different from zero.
22
Direct evidence on the conduct of fiscal policy suggests the existence of decision 
lags in the sense that it is not possible to learn about a GDP shock, decide what fiscal 
measures to take in response, pass these measures through the legislature and implement 
them within three months as pointed out by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Thus, the 
 
                                                     
22 For details, see Perotti (2004) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
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discretionary change in variable i in response to a change in variable j is zero. As a 
consequence, in quarterly data the systematic discretionary component of utT and utg will 
be zero: the coefficients αji’s will only reflect the automatic response to economic 
activity. Because the reduced form residuals are correlated with the et’s, it is not possible 
to estimate the αji’s by ordinary least squares.  
We, therefore, need to construct the elasticities of fiscal variable i to the 
macroeconomic variable j to compute cyclically adjusted reduced form fiscal policy 
shocks: utT,CA = utT − αyTuty − αpTutp − αiTutr = βgTetg + etT (4) utg,CA = utg − αyguty − αpgutp − αigutr = βTgetT + etg (5) 
The next step of the estimation procedure is to decide the relative ordering of the 
fiscal variables to identify the structural shocks to those. While imposing βgT = 0 
postulates the priority of tax decisions, βT
g  can be set to zero if government spending 
decisions are deemed to come first. It might be hard to find plausible arguments that fully 
justify any of these orderings. In the baseline specification the latter assumption is 
employed. The reverse ordering does not affect the results given the low correlation 
between the two reduced form fiscal shocks. 
Consequently, it is possible to estimate βgT by OLS from the following equations: utg,CA = etg  (7) utT,CA = βgTetg + etT  (8) 
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Finally, the coefficients of the equations for the macroeconomic variables will be 
estimated recursively by means of instrumental variables regressions. With respect to real 
GDP, the following equation will be employed: uty = γgyutg + γTyutT + ety  (9) 
using etT and etgas instruments for utT and utg respectively. Likewise, the price equation utp = γgputg + γTputT + γyputy + etp    (10) 
can be estimated by using  etT, etg and ety as instruments. Finally, the interest rate equation  utr = γgrutg + γTr utT + γyruty + γprutp + etp  (11) 
can be estimated accordingly once  etp is recovered. After the reduced form of the VAR 
and all the coefficients are estimated, we can proceed to estimate the impulse responses 
using the structural moving average representation of the VAR. 
The Data 
Our sample comprises four countries: Canada, France, the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The benchmark specification of the VAR includes quarterly data on 
government spending (gt), net taxes (Tt) and GDP (yt) all in real terms23; the GDP 
deflator (pt), and the Treasury bill rate (rt).24
                                                     
23 Following the standard literature, the GDP deflator is employed to obtain the corresponding real values. 
 The variable Tt is defined as public 
revenues net of transfers, whereas gt includes both public consumption and public 
investment. All the variables, except the interest rate, are log-transformed. Since the 
availability of the quarterly fiscal variables, particularly for the net tax components, is a 
binding constraint, the sample runs from 1960:1 to 2000:4 for the US, 1961:1 to 2000:4 
 
24 The data source defines the Treasury bill rate as the rate at which short-term securities are issued or 
traded in the market. 
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for the UK and 1970:1 to 2000:4 for Canada and France. All variables have been 
seasonally adjusted by the original sources. For all countries, the Treasury bill rate and 
the GDP deflator data are obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
database.  The rest of the data have been taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 
the US and OECD World Economic Outlook for the other countries.  
The Specification 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS and the number of lags was set according to the 
information provided by likelihood ratio (LR) test, the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn information criteria and the final prediction error in general.25
In order to obtain the response of macroeconomic aggregates to various tax policy 
innovations, the VAR specification described in the previous section is estimated. Each 
model comprises of the following variables: government expenditures (gt), tax revenue 
(TT), measured by the tax revenue of the ith tax group), the GDP (yt), the GDP deflator 
(pt) and the Treasury bill rate (rt).  After the benchmark model (with total net taxes and 
government spending is estimated, we estimate the responses of macroeconomic 
aggregates to innovations in different tax groups by replacing total net taxes with each tax 
components separately. In a further step, we estimate a number of other specifications 
where GDP is substituted in turn by its private components.  
  
                                                     
25 Most of the time, the information criteria suggest different results.  For instance, while estimating 
the model with corporate income taxes for the US, Hannan Quinn and Schwarz criteria suggest 2 lags, 
whereas final prediction error and Akaike information criteria suggest 6 lags. Here, I choose 6 lags, 
since 2 lags is often regarded as too short to capture enough economic interpretations among variables 
for a model with quarterly data as also mentioned in Kim and Roubini (2008). However, as a robustness 
check, the model is also estimated with the alternative lags and led to very similar conclusions. For an 
extensive survey of model selection criteria, see also Lutkepohl (1991).   
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Following the leading studies in the literature26, the elasticities of taxes to GDP is 
constructed from data provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.27 We also assume that, in quarterly data, the contemporaneous elasticity of 
government purchases with respect to output is zero. Given that interest payments on 
government debt are excluded from the definitions of government net taxes and spending, 
the semi-elasticities of these two variables with respect to interest rate, αr
g and αrT, 
innovations are set to zero.28 Finally, following Tenhofen et al. (2006), the GDP deflator 
elasticity is simply the real GDP elasticity of the fiscal variable less one.29
II.III. Empirical Results 
 Table 2.1 
provides an overview of the quarterly elasticities in use.  
I compute the effects of various types of fiscal policy shocks on the basis of the 
estimated SVAR model. The figures depict the results displaying the impulse responses 
to a 1% exogenous increase in the corresponding fiscal variable. In all cases, impulse 
responses are reported for five years and the 90% confidence bands, corresponding to the 
5th and 95th percentiles of the responses, have been obtained by bootstrapping with 200 
replications. In this respect, it is worth noting that, the choice of the confidence interval 
width is wider than that of the 68% literature standard.  
                                                     
26 For instance, Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Perotti (2007). 
 
27 The calculations are based on Van den Noord (2000),  Daude et al (2010). 
 
28 This is again one of the standard assumptions in the literature. See Perotti (2004), Castro and De Cos 
(2008), Tenhofen et al. (2006). 
 
29 The authors mainly follow the assumption that “the response of the nominal fiscal variable is the 
same to both price and real GDP movements, which is, in turn, given by the real GDP elasticity of the 
real fiscal variable. Provided nominal prices do not influence real GDP, the GDP deflator elasticity is 
the real GDP elasticity of the fiscal variable less 1”. 
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Figures (2.1)-(2.4) display the impulse responses of the various macroeconomic 
indicators to a total net tax shock. Specifically, while the response of output in France is 
statistically insignificant, GDP falls on impact in response to net taxes innovations in the 
US, Canada and the United Kingdom. While the response of GDP in the European 
countries and Canada remains significant almost for a year, the significant decline of 
GDP in the US30 appears to be more persistent, which is in line with the results of Burriel 
et al. (2010). Moreover, it should be noted that, in the UK, Canada and France, GDP 
tends to increase after ten quarters which is consistent with the findings of Perotti 
(2004).31
In France, private consumption is consistently crowded in even though the 
increase becomes significant after two years which is in line with a Keynesian model. 
Furthermore, we find that private consumption is crowded out by taxation in the US, 
Canada and the UK as is consistent with neo-classical theory. Here, it should also be 
noted that, due to the increase in taxes, as consumers reduce their consumption, the 
national savings will increase lowering the real interest rate in these countries in the 
medium-run.  
 
 
                                                     
30 Here, it is worth recalling that I have been working on 0.90 probability which indicates that the 
bands in this study are broader. Therefore, most of the results for US turn out to be significant in 0.68 
probability (which is the common probability measure in the literature). 
 
31 Perotti (2004) finds positive tax multipliers for Australia, the UK and West Germany. According to 
him, it is because of the smaller output elasticities of net taxes. However, here, I did not identify any 
positive impact effect. What we are ending up with is that GDP tends to increase after three years in 
France and almost four years in UK which turns out to be rather counter-intuitive. Yet, even though 
the standard literature studies the effects of fiscal policy by employing conventional VARs, it should be 
noted that the forecasting limitations of this methodology for such long horizons advise against 
drawing conclusions from this result (De Castro and De Cos, 2008). 
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As regards investment, figures (2.1)-(2.4) and (2.5)-(2.8) point to the following 
results: In the standard Keynesian approach, an increase in spending may yield either an 
increase or a decrease in investment depending on the relative strength of the effects of 
the increase in output and the increase in the interest rate; but, in either case, increases in 
spending and taxes have opposite effects on investment as mentioned in Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002). While this is the case in our results for France and partially for Canada, 
we did not reach the same conclusion for the US32
Figures (2.5)-(2.8) shows the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to an 
increase in government spending. The impact response of GDP is positive
 and the United Kingdom.   
33
In addition, the behavior of private consumption largely mimics that of GDP: it 
basically increases on impact in the US, Canada and France but decreases in the United 
Kingdom. While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in 
line with neo-classical theory.  
 and 
significant in all countries except the United Kingdom. While the size of the response is 
similar in the US, Canada and France, the shape of the impulse response of output is 
slightly different, in the sense that, after an initial rise, GDP starts declining and after 
about 10 quarters, it slightly rises again in France. In Canada, after an initial increase, 
there is a decrease in output, whereas in the US the increase in output is persistent. In the 
UK, the response of GDP is insignificantly negative which is consistent with the results 
of Perotti (2004) for this country.  
                                                     
32 This is, again, supporting the results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  
 
33 For the US, this is in line with the positive response estimated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2009), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Fatas and Mihov (2001). 
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Government spending shocks have positive effects on the interest rate in three 
countries (Canada, France and the UK) and essentially no impact effect in the United 
States.34
Figures (2.9)-(2.12) present the effects of a shock to social security contributions 
on macroeconomic indicators. As is widely known, social security taxes are levied on 
labor as a payroll tax. A priori, the impact response of output will, therefore, depend on 
two effects: the substitution effect and the income effect.  
 It is useful to note here that, the former result can be reconciled both with a neo-
classical and a Keynesian model.   
Social security tax innovations will lead to a decrease in tax-payer’s after tax 
reward for each extra hour worked, lowering the cost of leisure. Thus, via the substitution 
effect (SE), the individual will be willing to work less in response to lower reward. On 
the other hand, a decrease in the real wage will reduce household lifetime earnings and, 
thus, human wealth. So, households, via the income effect (IE), will not be able to afford 
additional leisure and, as a result, will supply more labor. The relative magnitude of the 
two effects depends on the circumstances such as the elasticities of labor supply and 
demand. Hence, the hours worked may increase, decrease or remain the same after the 
tax innovation.  
It is seen from figure (2.9) that in the US, IE dominates SE yielding a significant 
increase in output on impact. It is also worth noting that the behavior of private 
investment and private consumption mimic that of GDP: it typically increases on impact 
in this country. For Canada, France and the UK, higher social security taxes decline 
output, which decreases significantly and remains significant for five years in France. As 
                                                     
34 Note that the interest rate response in the US and UK are insignificant for the entire period. 
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far as GDP components are concerned, investment and private consumption responses, in 
general, mimic the GDP’s one. Some slight differences may be observed though, 
particularly in the short-run behavior. The price level in Canada decreases significantly 
after four quarters and remains significant for five years due to the decrease in demand in 
response to a social security tax innovation in this country. However, the opposite 
behavior is observed in France in the sense that, after a significant decline in the short-
run, prices insignificantly rise in the medium-run due to the 0.4 % decrease in output in 
response to a shock to social security contributions.  
The impact effect of the social security tax innovation on the interest rate is 
positive in the US due to the increase in money demand and private investment, whereas 
the estimated impact effect on the interest rate is insignificant for the rest of the countries.  
Figures (2.13)-(2.16) present the effects of a shock to indirect taxes on 
macroeconomic indicators. The response of each component is typically similar across 
countries, hence summarizing their shapes is not difficult. Over the whole sample, the 
impact response is negative for GDP in all countries. Because they lower the purchasing 
power of real after-tax wages, indirect taxes lead to a strong incentive to curtail 
investment as seen in figures. On the other hand, since the indirect taxes can be defined 
as the sales taxes, taxes on goods and services, there is a decrease in consumption in 
response to an increase in tax levels. Indirect tax innovations also lead to a decrease in 
the price level due to lower demand. Note that, with the partial exception of Canada and 
France (where we have seen an insignificant increase in the interest rate for three 
quarters), there is a decline in the interest rate on impact in response to an indirect tax 
innovation. This can be explained by the decrease in income and investment levels.  
51 
 
Figures (2.17)-(2.20) depict the responses of the endogenous variables to an 
income tax innovation. Here, two opposing effects need to be taken into account. First, an 
increase in income taxes reduces the household wealth by increasing the present value of 
household tax liabilities. Thus, consumption decreases while saving, interest rate and 
labor supply increases. However, the rise in hours worked will lead to a decline in real 
wages, therefore, investment and output increase. This is the wealth effect. Second, the 
same policy will slow down economic activity by decreasing output. Because the money 
demand depends on income, the decline in output decreases the interest rate which 
partially crowds in private investment. The degree of crowding in will hinge on the 
sensitivity of private investment to income and the interest rate. Yet, the final effect of 
the contraction will be a decline in consumption, investment and output. This is the 
output effect. Hence, the overall effect on macroeconomic indicators will depend on these 
two effects.  
For the US, Canada and the UK, the output effect dominates the wealth effect and 
therefore the impact response of consumption, investment and output are negative. For 
France, although the impact response of output and investment are negative, the output 
persistently increases, and there is an insignificant increase in investment after the third 
quarter. On the other hand, it should be noted that consumption significantly rises in 
Canada and France. There are several ways to explain this.35
                                                     
35 Another plausible explanation takes place when habit formation is included in any model. For more 
details, see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Bouakez and Rebei (2007). Alternatively, Corsetti, 
Meier and Muller (2009) modeled a spending reversal effect and ended up with the same conclusion. 
 For instance, Linnemann 
(2006) applies a non-seperable utility function in consumption and leisure in a RBC setup 
in which consumption and leisure are substitutes. The negative wealth effect of the fiscal 
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contraction raises hours worked which decreases leisure. The marginal utility of 
consumption, therefore, increases. In order to lessen the negative wealth effect, 
individuals are willing to work more and to consume more which will lead to an increase 
in consumption. 
Figures (2.21)-(2.24) display the responses of the macroeconomic indicators to a 
corporate income tax innovation. The impulse responses show a significant positive 
response of GDP on impact for all countries except the United Kingdom, which can, 
again, be explained by the negative wealth effect and output effect. Here, the wealth 
effect dominates the income effect for Canada, France and the United States. Moreover, it 
should be further noted that the increase in capital income tax will be reflected in the 
prices. It will lower the purchasing power of real after-tax wages and therefore the 
positive impact on output caused by the wealth effect will be accentuated. As a result, an 
increase in corporate income tax will lead to a positive impact effect on GDP and all the 
private components of gross domestic product. Thus, after an increase on impact, private 
consumption and private investment will fall in the medium and the long-run in the 
United States. However, the significant positive impact on investment persists for almost 
three years in Canada whereas there is an insignificant increase in consumption. Here, it 
should be noted that our results are in line with and Arin and Koray (2006) and Heppke-
Falk et al. (2006).36
                                                     
36 The former study is done for Germany whereas the latter is for Canada. Both of the papers ended up 
with an increase in GDP in response to a corporate income tax innovation. According to Heppke-Falk 
et al. (2002), this might result from some sort of reverse causality stemming from identification 
difficulties due to problems with exogenous elasticities. However, this is not the case in this study. 
Although I am confident that the presented elasticities accurately capture the automatic stabilizers, as a 
 It is also worth mentioning that corporate income tax innovations 
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have positive effects on impact on the nominal interest rate in three countries (Canada, 
France and the US) due to the increase in income and investment on impact; and 
essentially an insignificant impact effect in the United Kingdom. 
Robustness Checks 
I performed a variety of robustness checks to our 5 variable VAR specification. 
First of all, a different ordering of the expenditure variables when identifying the shocks 
was employed. So far, government spending was ordered first. Yet, there is no basis for 
choosing one orthogonalization over the other as mentioned in Perotti (2004). 
Nevertheless, all the responses were re-estimated under the assumption that government 
spending was ordered after taxes. The results obtained with this alternative specification 
were very close to those of the benchmark model. 
As mentioned in Perotti (2004), the implementation of lags of fiscal policy could 
undermine the predictability of the estimated fiscal policy shocks. It might require some 
time for fiscal policy changes to be implemented and according to the author, the private 
sector might anticipate these changes before the econometrician. However, it is shown in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that allowing for anticipations of fiscal policy does not 
substantially alter the results. Nonetheless, in order to check the robustness of the 
baseline results, I tried some alternative lag lengths. Even though there were some minor 
differences in point estimates, the results were generally involved in the 68% bandwidth 
of baseline estimates.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
robustness check, I re-estimate the SVAR assuming slightly different elasticities, without any 
substantive change of the results. 
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In addition, although we were confident that the elasticities we used accurately 
capture the working of automatic stabilizers, we reassessed the sensitivity of the results 
was assessed by varying those values. First, following Perotti (2004), I assumed a -0.5 
price elasticity of government spending. The results were, again, very close to the 
benchmark model. The differences were minimal in the sense that there was a slight 
change on point estimates of the impulse responses.  
Finally, I evaluated the sensitivity of the results to different values for the output 
and price elasticity of various tax instruments. It is shown in Cohen and Folette (1999) 
that there has only been a slight fluctuation in tax elasticities over time in the United 
States. Therefore, to see whether there is a significant change in impulse responses, the 
benchmark elasticities were replaced with their 10% bandwidth values. The results 
obtained with these alternative elasticities were, again, very close to those of the 
benchmark model. There were only a few percentage points change in estimates of the 
impulse responses.37
II.IV. Conclusion 
  
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of total net tax and government 
spending shocks on GDP, prices and interest rates in four OECD countries using a 
structural Vector Autoregression approach with the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
identification scheme. Moreover, we propose a structural decomposition of net taxes into 
four components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social 
insurance taxes. Our results suggest that analyzing the  fiscal  policy by  decomposing net  
 
                                                     
37 The results are available upon request. 
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taxes and examining their effect on the aggregate economy provide a more accurate 
picture than treating net taxes as the fiscal policy variable.  
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) 
Decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components are found to 
have different impacts on economic variables; 2) The size and persistence of these effects 
vary across countries depending on different effects (i.e. negative wealth and output 
effects, substitution effect and income effect) resulting from the structure of these 
economies; 3) The positive tax multipliers reported in previous studies are found only for 
corporate income tax in the US, Canada and France and for social security tax in the US; 
4) As regards macro theories, on the one hand, we find that private investment is crowded 
out both by taxation and government spending in the UK and the US as is consistent with 
the neo-classical model. On the other hand, our results for France and partially for 
Canada indicate that there are opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private 
investment that are in line with Keynesian theory; 5) Private consumption is crowded in 
by government spending for all countries except the UK, and crowded out by taxation in 
all countries except France. While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, 
the latter is in line with neo-classical theory.  
My analysis sheds light on the interpretation of positive net tax multipliers found 
in the existing literature. Decompositions of net tax innovations will help us better assess 
the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy shocks and, it is, therefore, important 
that we understand the extent to which increases in net taxes are driven by one shock or 
another.   
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The findings in this paper also indicate that existing approaches to modeling fiscal 
policy shocks have to be re-thought. First, the results suggest that the usefulness of the 
existing macroeconomic applied work built on the assumption of “total” tax changes may 
be unclear. In examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks, it is seen 
from our results that the traditional priority on net tax shocks may be misleading. Instead, 
more attention needs to be paid to different tax policy instruments.  
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Table 2.1. Exogenous Elasticities 
 
 United States Canada France United Kingdom 
𝜶𝒚
𝒕𝒄 1.8 1 1.8 0.6 
𝜶𝒚
𝒕𝒊 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.4 
𝜶𝒚
𝒕𝒔 0.6 0.9 0.5 1.2 
𝜶𝒚
𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1 
𝜶𝒚
𝑻 1.1 1 1 1.1 
𝜶𝒚
𝒈 0 0 0 0 
𝜶𝒑
𝒕𝒄 0.8 0 0.8 -0.4 
𝜶𝒑
𝒕𝒊 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.4 
𝜶𝒑
𝒕𝒔 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 
𝜶𝒑
𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 
𝜶𝒑
𝑻 -0.1 0 0 0.1 
𝜶𝒑
𝒈 -1 -1 -1 -1 
𝜶𝒄
𝒕𝒄 1.44 0.75 1.35 0.48 
𝜶𝒄
𝒕𝒊 0.48 0.9 0.45 1.12 
𝜶𝒄
𝒕𝒔 0.48 0.675 0.975 0.96 
𝜶𝒄
𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅 0.72 0.525 0.525 0.88 
𝜶𝒄
𝑻 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.88 
𝜶𝒄
𝒈 0 0 0 0 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒕𝒄  0.36 0.25 0.45 0.12 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒕𝒊  0.12 0.3 0.15 0.28 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒕𝒔  0.12 0.225 0.125 0.24 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒅 0.18 0.175 0.175 0.22 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝑻  0.22 0.25 0.25 0.22 
𝜶𝒊𝒏𝒗
𝒈  0 0 0 0 
 
 
𝑇: total net tax 
𝑡𝑐: corporate income tax 
𝑡𝑖: income tax 
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑: indirect tax 
𝑡𝑠: social security tax 
𝑖𝑛𝑣: private investment 
c: private consumption 
𝑔: government spending (public consumption +  public investment) 
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Figure 2.1.  Effects of total net tax innovations in the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Figure 2.2. Effects of total net tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 2.3. Effects of total net tax innovations in France 
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Figure 2.4. Effects of total net tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 2.5. Effects of government spending shocks in the US 
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Figure 2.6. Effects of government spending shocks in Canada 
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Figure 2.7. Effects of government spending shocks in France 
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Figure 2.8. Effects of government spending shocks in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 2.9. Effects of social security tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 2.10. Effects of social security tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 2.11. Effects of social security tax innovations in France 
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Figure 2.12. Effects of social security tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 2.13. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 2.14. Effects of indirect tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 2.15. Effects of indirect tax innovations in France 
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Figure 2.16. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
Figure 2.17. Effects of income tax innovations in the US 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Figure 2.18. Effects of income tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 2.19. Effects of income tax innovations in France 
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Figure 2.20. Effects of income tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 2.21. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 2.22. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 2.23. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in France 
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Figure 2.24. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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CHAPTER III 
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE HOUSING AND 
STOCK WEALTH EFFECTS: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
III.I. Introduction 
 The wealth effect, defined as the change in consumption expenditure induced by 
an exogenous change in wealth, has profound implications for measurement, diagnosis, 
and forecast of economic activity. For countries including the United States, consumption 
expenditure comprises the bulk of gross domestic product. The analysis of wealth effects 
thus has garnered attention from market practitioners, policy makers, and academic 
researchers. There are various components of wealth, thus various wealth effects 
associated with each of them. Yet a large body of literature examines and compares the 
magnitude of wealth effects from housing and stock market wealth, presumably two of 
the most significant components of wealth for households in developed countries. 
Several reasons exist for us to expect a larger wealth effect coming out of housing 
than out of stock market wealth. First, the volatility of stock markets is much higher than 
that of housing markets.38
                                                     
38See Figure 3.1 and 3.2 for demonstration of this point for countries in our sample. 
 Ceteris paribus, with higher volatility, gains and losses are less 
permanent, and households may accordingly exhibit a smaller propensity to consume out 
of stock wealth. Secondly, housing wealth is more evenly distributed among households 
than is stock wealth. For that reason, even if a household responds in the same way to 
both wealth shocks, in aggregate we may still observe a larger magnitude for housing 
wealth. Finally, in most economies, housing assets can be easily pledged as collateral to 
borrow funds, through mortgages or home equity loans. The same is less the case for 
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stock assets. The increased use of homes as collateral has strengthened the positive effect 
of rising housing wealth on consumption as well as on the rest of the economy via 
household borrowing the “financial accelerator” effect (Aoki et al., 2002; Cardarelli et 
al., 2008). 
Yet a couple of factors point to the opposite direction. First, as Poterba (2000) 
points out, the rise of house prices increases the implicit “user cost” of living in a house, 
which may undercut the boost to nonhousing consumption induced by rising wealth due 
to higher house value. Secondly, housing wealth is measured less precisely, which may 
lead a household's reaction to wealth change more lukewarm. Finally, transaction costs 
related to housing eat into a larger percentage of the housing value appreciation, 
discouraging homeowners from cashing out the increased equity. Thus which set of 
factors dominate the other is an empirical question. 
We re-examine the housing and stock wealth effects by employing the vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework which incorporates the dynamic, interactive structure 
of variables with each other. Using macro time series for a group of developed countries, 
we estimate the VAR model with specified structural error terms. The model stipulates 
that the shocks specific to housing wealth precede those specific to stock markets and to 
personal income, and that the shocks specific to stock markets precede those to personal 
income. We shall discuss the justification of this recursive ordering after presenting the 
empirical specification, but we note here that the results obtained with other orderings are 
very similar. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: for all the countries in our sample 
except Australia, we find a larger initial wealth effect of housing than that of stock 
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wealth. The on impact value of consumption to a 10%  housing wealth shock ranges from 
0.60%  (Finland) to 6.42%  (Sweden). Yet the long-run effects on consumption from 
housing and stock wealth vary considerably across countries. Despite the greater initial 
housing wealth effects, however, over time stock market wealth effects catch up and are 
mostly persistent, whereas housing wealth effects level off and may decline eventually. 
Our results suggest that, for monetary policy purposes, it would be oversimplifying to 
emphasize the immediate, higher impact on consumption from housing markets. 
Policymakers have to keep an open eye on the long-run, more persistent impact from 
equity markets. 
Regarding the relative magnitude of wealth effects of housing and of stock 
wealth, empirical evidence is mixed. Previous works have found a larger wealth effect for 
housing from macro-level aggregate data for the US Benjamin et al., 2004; Case et al., 
2005; Carroll et al., 2011), and from micro-level survey data for the US (Bostic et al., 
2009), and for Spain (Bover, 2005). From these works, the marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) from housing wealth is around 0.03-0.1, while that from financial wealth 
is around 0.02-0.08. However, Dvornak and Kohler (2007) find the opposite for 
Australia. 
Fewer studies have compared both wealth effects from a cross-country 
perspective. Indeed, as a result of cultural, institutional, and market-related differences, a 
cross-country comparison might shed light on what may be the driving force behind the 
differences in wealth effects. Slacalek (2009, Figure 3.1) shows that there is a great deal 
of heterogeneity in MPC between countries. He incorporates the sluggishness of 
consumption in estimating MPC in a two-step empirical procedure. For the 16  countries 
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in his sample, some countries (such as the US and the UK) have substantially larger 
housing wealth effect than financial wealth effect while the rest (such as Canada and 
Japan) do not, although these estimates are imprecise. Ludwig and Slok (2004) find a 
significantly positive relationship between stock prices and consumption for OECD 
countries in a pooled mean group analysis, but the relationship is insignificant between 
house prices and consumption. Edison and Slok (2002) focus on the stock wealth effects 
for eight countries and find that the wealth effect of the information technology stock 
market sector is smaller than that of other sectors. 
As regards methodology, a strand of literature has used sophisticated models other 
than VAR in estimating wealth effects. Some studies have invoked panel data techniques 
in their estimation (Dvornak and Kohler, 2007; Slacalek, 2009). More closely related to 
our VAR approach is error-correction models that aim to capture long-run equilibrium 
effects. Case et al. (2005) employ an error-correction model in which only consumption 
and income have equilibrium errors while housing and stock wealth do not. Benjamin et 
al. (2004) carefully examines unit-root and co-integration issues in the US aggregate data 
(and differ from Case et al. (2005) in terms of sources and measurements) and arrive at 
the same conclusion. Ludwig and Slok (2004) and Cardarelli et al. (2008, Table 3.6) 
expand the accommodation of equilibrium errors to the housing and stock price variables, 
while still maintaining that consumption is the sole dependent variable responsive to 
changes in other variables. The closest in methodology to our paper is Edison and Slok 
(2002), though their research question, their employed variables and their Cholesky 
ordering are different. 
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Were cointegration an issue, our VAR model could be revised into the form of 
vector error-correction model (VECM), which would allow for equilibrium errors of the 
kind assumed by the aforementioned literature. Carroll et al. (2011) argue against the use 
of cointegrating/VECM models in estimating wealth effects, for neither theory nor 
evidence implies the existence of a stable cointegrating vector. Edison and Slok (2002) 
caution against the underlying restrictive assumptions and the demand for large sample 
size associated with cointegration estimation, even though all of the countries in their 
sample have one cointegration vector. For our data set, statistical tests indicate the 
cointegration is not a serious concern for the majority of countries. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the exact 
empirical specification we use under the structural VAR framework. Section three 
presents data. Section four discusses estimation results, and section five concludes. 
III.II. Econometric Methodology and Data 
 The simplest specification for estimating various wealth effects takes the form  
ttytstht YSHC εβββα ++++=   (1) 
where tC  stands for consumption of goods and services, tH  for housing wealth, tS  for 
stock wealth, and tY  for personal disposable income. Such a specification can be derived 
from the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH) consumption theories, as is 
shown in Benjamin et al. (2004), Dvornak and Kohler (2007), and other studies. As such, 
estimated coefficients of hβ  and sβ  measure the MPC out of housing wealth, and of 
stock wealth, respectively. 
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We extend the content contained in (1) into the VAR framework. One substantial 
advantage of the VAR is to bring forth the dynamic structure between variables. The 
reduced-form VAR is specified by the following equation:  
tktk
K
k
t UYBBY ++ −∑
1=
0=   (2) 
where tY  is the vector of variables ),,,( tttt CYSH  , kB  is the matrix of coefficients for 
the k -th lag of tY , and tU  is the vector of reduced form innovations. The value of K , 
the number of lags included in (2), is to be determined by the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) and the Final Prediction Error (FPE). 
It is well known that a reduced form VAR like (2) does not allow correlations 
among variables to be interpreted casually (see, e.g., Stock and Watson 2001). We need a 
structural VAR representation with “identifying assumptions” for that purpose:  
ttt
k
k
K
k
L BeABAUABYBIA ++−∑ 00
1=
==)(  (3) 
where the vector of structural shocks )(0, 4Ie Nt :  and [ ] 0ee ='stE  for all ts ≠ . The 
matrix A  describes the contemporaneous relation between the variables and the reduced 
form residuals tU . The matrix B  specifies the linear relation between the orthogonal 
structural shocks and the reduced form residuals (Heppke-Falk et al., 2010). One version 
of the so-called Cholesky restrictions to achieve identification on the system is that A  is 
a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal, and B  a triangular matrix. 
By adopting this version of Cholesky restrictions, we assume that the components 
of tY  enter in the order of ),,,( tttt CYSH . This, coupled with the lower triangular matrix 
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A , implies that the current shock to the housing wealth tH  precedes all other 
contemporaneous shocks, the shock to tY  is affected by contemporaneous shocks to tH  
and tS , and the shock to tC  is affected by contemporaneous shocks to all the rest. 
Our justification of the recursive ordering of shocks in the model, especially the 
contemporaneous housing shock being exogenous to other shocks, draws on recent 
literature on housing, business cycles, and the macro economy. Leamer (2007) argues 
that the housing sector cycle is one of the most important precursors of the US business 
cycle. He demonstrates that in the US, eight out of ten recessions are preceded by 
substantial problems in housing, and the residential investment contribution to the US 
recessions and recoveries (measured in the year before the business cycle peaks and in 
the subsequent two years) is substantial. Ghent and Owyang (2010) find no consistent 
statistical relationship between local housing and local business cycles by examining the 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas data for the US cities. Yet, they also find that national 
housing building permits are a leading indicator for local employment. Helbling and 
Terrones (2003, Figure 2.1) show that, even though both housing and equity prices have 
generally coincided or overlapped with recessions, half of all housing price busts in the 
post-war period overlapped with equity price crashes, while only one-third of all equity 
price busts overlapped with housing price busts. Additionally, during 1970–2002, the 
negative output effects associated with housing price busts were about twice as large as 
those of equity price busts.39
                                                     
39Still, to guard against the possibility that our results hinge critically on this particular Choleski ordering, 
we also experiment with other alternative orderings. The results obtained with these alternative orderings 
are very similar. 
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The Data  
 We use quarterly data with different time coverage for the following countries: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, 
and Switzerland.40 The data include following variables: housing price index, stock 
market capitalization, consumption expenditure, and household disposable income. We 
obtain the stock market capitalization from Thomson Reuters Datastream as the measure 
of stock wealth. Consumption is the measure of private final consumption expenditure as 
is defined in the System of National Account used by OECD, including goods and 
services.41
Conceptually, a natural candidate for measuring housing wealth is home value. 
Practically, we can obtain the value of real estate owned by households only for the 
United States. For other countries, the relevant data available is the housing price index, 
and following the practice of existing literature in this field, we use it as a proxy for 
housing wealth for these countries.
  
42
                                                     
40Table 3.5 summarizes the time coverage as well as the number of observations for analysis for each 
country in our data. In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
quarterly house price index is available only for the countries in our sample, plus New Zealand. However, 
disposable income (or industrial production as its proxy) is not available for New Zealand. Therefore we do 
not include New Zealand in our analysis. Ludwig and Slok (2004) include more countries than ours due to 
the fact that they interpolate quarterly housing prices via annual observations.  
 Yet by using housing prices we fail to pick up the 
change in the size or quality of the housing capital stock per capita caused by the change 
in housing prices. However, Cardarelli et al. (2008) argue that monetary policy now 
 
41The consumption measure includes both durable and non-durable components. Mehra (2001) points out 
that the total consumption is indeed the variable of interest in estimation of the long-term consumption-
wealth relationship. 
 
42Exceptions exist. Case et al. (2005) adjust the housing price index by the homeownership rate and the 
number of households for a country. Slacalek (2009) constructs a measure of housing wealth from a 
combination of first and secondary data sources. 
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transmits more through the price of houses than through residential investments. Thus, 
omitting the change in the housing capital stock due to residential investments may not be 
as damaging as it sounds. 
That being said, for the US, both housing value and housing price index are 
available. We compare the results of estimated impulse response functions by separately 
employing these two data series for the US, and find quantitatively small differences 
between these two. In particular, for the US, the comparison between the values of 
impulse response functions for housing and for stock value does not change, no matter 
which data series we use for the housing value. 
All variables are adjusted to real terms according to the respective Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) for each country. Except for the housing price index, all variables are 
on a per capita basis. If not already so in the original data, they are seasonally adjusted by 
the X12-ARIMA method. Finally, we use the natural logarithm of these variables in 
estimation, for it would be inappropriate to put housing price indexes with other values 
on the same footing in levels. Accordingly, our interpretation of the estimates would be in 
elasticities, rather than in marginal propenstity to consume. Later we convert estimates of 
elasticities back into MPC for comparison with the existing literature. 
If VAR contains non-stationary variables, VECM is needed to specify a linear 
combination of integrated variables that is stationary. We employ the maximum 
eigenvalue test and the Johansen trace test to detect cointegrating relationships between 
the variables. Lutkepohl et al. (2001) provide evidence that these two tests may end up 
with different results for short samples, which is indeed the case for Belgium in our data 
set: according to the maximum eigenvalue test, there is no cointegrating relationship; 
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according to the Johansen trace test, we find a maximum of two cointegrating 
relationships. For Finland and Australia, both maximum eigenvalue and trace tests 
suggest that a maximum of one cointegrating relationship exists. We provide the results 
of Johansen trace test in Table 3.1. The table shows that cointegration is strongly rejected 
(at significance level 1% ) for other five of the eight countries. Even for the countries 
with suspected cointegration vectors, our sample period is not long enough to impose 
robust long-run relationships between the variables, the same point noted by Edison and 
Slok (2002).43
Furthermore, we run stability tests to see whether the estimated VAR is stable, in 
the sense that the variables are covariance stationary. The results show that the 
eigenvalue stability condition is satisfied for all countries except Australia. One approach 
to address non-stationarity is to difference the data. However, Sims (1980) and Sims et al. 
(1990) caution against differencing, as differencing throws away information concerning 
the co-movements in the data. Thus we choose not to difference the Australia data before 
estimation. 
 Thus we still apply the same structural VAR analysis to these countries. 
III.III. Empirical Results  
 We determine the lag structure, namely, the value of K  in (2), for each country 
based on AIC and FPE criteria. Our examination of the data reveals that the second-order 
lag structure is adequate for Australia, Sweden and the UK, that third-order is adequate 
for Canada, Finland and Switzerland, and that fourth-order is adequate for Belgium and 
the United States. 
                                                     
43The longest time coverage in our data set is from 1973 to 2009 for the US, whereas the comparable 
coverage in Edison and Slok (2002) is from 1990 to 2000. However, ours are quarterly data and theirs are 
monthly, therefore our effective sample period is not effectively longer. 
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Figure 3.2 and 3.3 depict consumption responses to housing price shocks for the 
eight different countries in our data set. The horizontal axis indicates the time that has 
passed, in quarters, after a 10%  exogenous shock to housing prices initially. The vertical 
axis indicates the corresponding changes to consumption in percentages. Dashed and 
dotted lines indicate, respectively, 1.645  and one standard deviation confidence bands 
(or, 90%  and 68%  confidence intervals). For all countries except Finland, we observe 
that the initial consumption response to a housing price shock (i.e., on impact response) is 
positive and statistically significant at a 10%  level. Sweden exhibits the largest on impact 
consumption response, at 6.42%  to a 10%  shock, and Finland exhibits the least, at 
0.6%  which is not statistically significant. 
However, housing price has only a transitory effect on consumption, as is 
revealed by figure 3.2 and 3.3. Consumption multipliers of housing price shocks level off 
over time and decline eventually: for the majority of these countries, after 12 quarters, the 
consumption multiplier declines to a value that is less than the response on impact. 
Furthermore, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the shape of the impulse-response 
function over time: for Canada, the UK, and Sweden it peaks very soon and then trends 
down swiftly, whereas for Belgium and Switzerland the trends are visible but almost flat. 
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 depict consumption responses to stock market capitalization 
shocks for the same countries. The responses on impact for all countries, except Finland, 
are positive and statistically significant at a 10%  level. Canada leads in the consumption 
response on impact at 2.27%  to a 10%  shock, and Finland again ranks as the last, at a 
statistically insignificant 0.15% . Yet, in contrast to the pattern of responses to housing 
price shocks, the consumption multipliers of five countries (except the US, Belgium, and 
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Switzerland) keep increasing over time. After 8 quarters, all countries have a larger 
consumption multiplier than the consumption response on impact. Edison and Slok 
(2002, figure 4) also obtain a persistent consumption response to stock valuation shocks 
for their selected countries. Their sample includes the US, Canada, the UK, which are 
also included in our sample; however, their estimated effects are much smaller in 
comparison to ours. 
To compare the consumption multipliers to house price shocks with those to stock 
market capitalization shocks, we tabulate the two-year impact effects in Table 3.2. The 
consumption response is to a 10%  initial shock to housing prices, or to stock market 
capitalization. Seven countries (Australia excluded) exhibit a larger initial response to 
housing price shocks than to stock market capitalization shocks, sometimes substantially 
(e.g., 6.42%  versus 2.14%  in the case of Sweden).44
Could the differences in wealth effects of housing and stocks be attributable to the 
use of housing prices instead of home values? We investigate this by replacing household 
real estate values with the housing price index for the United States. Figure 3.6 
demonstrates the dynamic wealth effects of consumption to housing price shocks by 
separately using these two data series for housing wealth. The basic pattern that the 
consumption multiplier levels off and eventually falls does not change, yet the 
 By the end of two years, however, 
four of these countries display a larger consumption multiplier in response to a stock 
market capitalization shock than to a housing price shock. 
                                                     
44Our results for Australia are consistent with the findings in Dvornak and Kohler (2007). Based on state-
level data for Australia, they find that the MPC out of housing wealth (0.02-0.05) is lower than that out of 
stock wealth (0.08-0.12). 
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consumption multiplier estimated from housing price series drops off more precipitously. 
Figure 3.7 shows that the impact on estimates of consumption multipliers to stock value 
shocks is minimal when switching to housing value series.45
After analyzing the wealth effects separately for each country, we are now at a 
position where we can gauge the average effects by examining the mean group estimates. 
This estimator has been applied in Dvornak and Kohler (2007), Edison and Slok (2002), 
Slacalek (2009), to name a few. In essence, it is equivalent to pooling the data and 
imposing the identical-slopes restriction for all countries.
 
46
10%
 We show the results in Table 
3.3. For all countries as a whole, the initial consumption response to a  housing price 
shock is 2.79% , in contrast to the (statistically insignificant) 1.31%  to a 10%  stock 
market value shock. Still, by the end of two years, the stock wealth effect overshadows 
the housing, consistent with the pattern for the majority of countries observed above, 
even though these mean group estimates are not statistically significant after 8 quarters. 
We divide the eight countries into two groups: Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, 
Canada, the UK, and the United States) versus Continental Europe countries (Belgium, 
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland). The rationale is that the former group has a more 
robust housing and  stock  market system  than the  latter. From Table 3.3 we observe that  
the wealth effects on consumption for the former group are generally greater than those 
for the latter group. 
                                                     
45Likewise, Edison and Slok (2002) find that, by the substitution of stock prices for stock market 
capitalization as a measure of wealth for the US, none of their VAR estimates of stock wealth effects 
changes. 
 
46Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that mean group estimators can provide consistent estimates in dynamic 
models with heterogeneous coefficients across groups (countries). Strictly speaking, the number of 
countries in our sample is small, thus the criteria of large N  for applying the mean group estimator is not 
satisfied. The results reported below should be treated with caution. 
95 
 
All the estimates listed so far are expressed in terms of elasticities. It is 
straightforward to multiply the elasticity by the consumption-wealth ratio to obtain MPCs 
that can be compared with the existing estimates of MPCs in the literature. Since the 
housing and stock wealth values are both available only for the US, we select the US to 
carry out this exercise. Note that the consumption-wealth ratio itself varies over time. We 
choose two different three-year time periods for the calculation of the MPCs: one is from 
2003q1 to 2005q1, representative of the booming period for both housing and stock 
markets; the other is from 2006q1 to 2008q1, representative of the bust period. 
Table 3.4 presents the MPCs calculated for these two time periods. For the boom 
years, the computed MPC out of housing wealth is 0.093 in the initial period, which 
means for the US a dollar increase in housing prices leads to an immediate 9.3  cents rise 
in consumption. This finding compares with a 0.060  MPC out of stock wealth initially. 
By the end of two years, the MPC out of housing wealth is 0.24 , whereas the MPC out 
of stock wealth is 0.136 . For the bust period, initially, the housing and stock wealth 
MPCs are both lower than those in the boom years ( 0.08 and 0.051 now). Yet because 
of the decline in both housing and stock wealth values and the fact that consumption 
cannot decline indefinitely, by the end of two years, the MPCs become substantially 
greater those in the boom period. The initial MPCs for housing and/or stock wealth are 
within the range of those reported in the literature for the US (Benjamin et al. 2004; 
Cardarelli et al. 2008; Slacalek, 2009).47
                                                     
47Our estimated initial MPCs of housing and stock wealth are close to the “eventual” MPCs obtained in 
Carroll et al. (2011), whose approach exploits the sluggishness in consumption response to shocks. 
 Nevertheless, the crucial additional insight from 
our study is that the two-year MPCs turn out to be much greater due to the dynamic 
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effects of one variable on the others. In particular, this finding of continuing stock wealth 
effects boosting consumption for a few quarters is consistent with that in Dynan and 
Maki (2001), who use Consumer Expenditure Survey micro data in their analysis. Our 
estimated magnitude also agrees with what they obtain. 
Empirically teasing out the causes behind the differences in housing and stock 
wealth effects is a difficult task. Here we just navigate on one key difference between 
housing and stock assets: housing assets can be used for collateralized borrowing, while it 
is less common for households to post stock shares to borrow. We explore the 
relationship between estimated housing wealth effects and country values of Mortgage 
Market Index (MMI) constructed by Cardarelli et al. (2008). Mortgage Market Index is 
constructed from a variety of indicators, including mortgage equity withdrawal, 
refinancing easiness, typical loan-to-value ratio, mortgage-backed security issues, et 
cetera, and measures the maturity and development of mortgage market of a country. A 
higher value of MMI indicates easier household access to mortgage credit. Table 3.2 lists 
the values of MMI for our sample of countries except Switzerland, for which the data is 
not available. Figure 3.9 plots the on impact, 1-year, and 2-year consumption elasticities 
to a 10%  housing price shock against the Mortgage Market Index constructed by 
Cardarelli et al. (2008). The trendlines of these scatter plots visualize the fact that those 
countries with higher MMIs are associated with greater housing wealth effects. 
III.IV. Conclusion  
 This paper employs the structural VAR model to analyze the relationship 
between consumption, income, and stock and housing wealth. We apply this model to 
time series data of eight developed countries. Our main finding is that for a majority of 
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countries in our data housing wealth exerts a larger and statistically significant response 
of consumption on impact than stock wealth does, yet the long-run effects of a housing 
wealth shock are not as persistent as those of a stock capitalization shock. For the US, our 
estimates imply an immediate MPC of 8-9 cents out of a dollar increase in housing 
wealth, in contrast to a MPC of 5-6 cents for stock wealth. Our identification strategy is 
based on the particular Cholesky recursive ordering but our results are robust to other 
orderings as well. 
Because of data availability, we can only use housing prices as a proxy for house 
values. For the US, however, we do have data for both housing prices and household 
owned real estate values, and we find that our results are not sensitive to which measure 
in use. We find a larger housing wealth effect is associated with easier access to mortgage 
credit for these countries. 
Our finding that the stock wealth effect is more persistent than the housing wealth 
effect probably stands in contrary to conventional wisdom. It is unclear how we can 
generalize this finding, however, since there are only eight countries in our sample. 
Nevertheless, the results are firm and robust for the US and they suggest important public 
policy implications. Existing studies that have obtained a higher, immediate MPC of 
housing markets would hint paying close attention to possible policy effects to housing 
markets rather than to equity markets. However, based on our study, a buoyant stock 
market, even though its immediate impact on the economy through consumption boosting 
is weaker, would make its economic contributions persistently over time. 
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Table 3.1. Results of Johansen trace tests for eight countries 
 
 
Table 3.2. The dynamic percentage change of consumption to a 10% shock to housing 
prices and to stock market capitalization 
 
 
 
Country Trace Statistic 1% Critical Maximum Rank
Australia 73.21 54.46 0
30.6 35.65 1*
Belgium 63.61 54.46 0
36.27 35.65 1
17.27 20.04 2*
Canada 52.18 54.46 0*
Finland 71.38 54.46 0
26.43 35.65 1*
Sweden 50.72 54.46 0*
Switzerland 47.64 54.46 0*
UK 51.8 54.46 0*
US (housing price) 47.77 54.46 0*
US (housing value 37 54.46 0*
Johansen trace test
Notes : “*” by the maximum rank indicates  that this  i s  the va lue of rank 
selected by Johansen’s  multiple-trace test procedure.
Country Mortgage market index(a) Initial 1-year 2-year Initial 1-year 2-year
Australia 0.69 1.38%** 2.47%** 1.42% 1.45%** 3.43%** 3.66%**
Canada 0.57 2.93%** 4.00%** 1.19% 2.27%** 3.86%** 2.84%*
UK 0.58 5.37%** 5.81%** 3.45%** 1.46%** 1.70%* 2.17%*
US (housing price) 2.35%** 5.09%** 5.37%** 0.94%** 2.1%** 3.04%**
US (housing value) 2.18%** 5.22%** 6.58%** 1.26%** 2.55%** 3.21%*
Belgium 0.34 1.54%** 3.36%** 3.40%** 0.50%* 1.11%* 3.90%**
Finland 0.49 0.60% -0.83% -2.79%* 0.15% 1.85%* 3.20%*
Sweden 0.66 6.42%** 9.00%** 7.33%* 2.14%** 3.98%** 3.77%*
Switzerland — 1.75%** 2.17%** 1.89%* 1.58%** 2.31%** 2.43%**
Notes : Consumption percentage change in response to a  10% exogenous  shock to hous ing prices  and to s tock market 
capi ta l i zation for each country. Al l ca lculations are based upon the impulse-response functions impl ied by our
SVAR estimates . Ini tia l elastici ty is the elastici ty in the ini tia l period. ** and * indicate statis tica l s igni ficance
levels of 0.1 and 0.32, respectively. (a) Mortgage market index is an index of the maturi ty and development of
mortgage market of a country (higher va lue indicating eas ier household access to mortgage credi t), constructed from
indicators of mortgage equity withdrawal , refinancing eas iness , typica l loan-to-va lue ratio, mortgage-backed
securi ty i s sues , et cetera . See Cardarel l i  et a l . (2008) for further deta i l .
house price shcok stock market value shock
Consumption response to a 10% 
0.98
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Table 3.3. The mean group estimators of consumption to a 10% shock to housing prices 
and to stock market capitalization 
 
 
Table 3.4. The Marginal Propensity to Consume for the United States 
 
 
Table 3.5. Summary period of coverage and number of observations for countries 
 
Region Initial 1-year 2-year Initial 1-year 2-year
Anglo-Saxon countrie 3.01%*** 4.34%* 2.86% 1.53%* 2.77%* 2.93%
Continental Europe 2.58%* 3.43%* 2.46% 1.09% 2.31% 3.33%
All 2.79%* 3.88% 2.66% 1.31% 2.54% 3.13%
Notes : Consumption percentage change in response to a 10% exogenous shock to hous ing
prices and to stock market capi ta l i zation for each region. Reported here are the unweighted
mean group estimators for each region. The standard error of each mean group estimator is
ca lculated assuming the estimates for each country are independent. Al l ca lculations are
based upon the impulse-response functions impl ied by our VAR estimates . Ini tia l elastici ty
is the elastici ty in the ini tia l period. ***, ** and * indicate statis tica l s igni ficance levels of
0.05, 0.1 and 0.32, respectively. Anglo-Saxon Countries include Austra l ia , Canada, UK, and US;
Continenta l  Europe countries  include Belgium, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Consumption response to a 10% 
house price shock stock market value shock
Initial 1-year 2-year Initial 1-year 2-year
2003q1 0.093 0.209 0.240 0.060 0.112 0.136
2007q1 0.080 0.224 0.345 0.051 0.107 0.214
U.S. Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) of
housing wealth stock wealth
Notes : MPC is ca lculated as the elastici ty of consumption to wealth multipl ied by consumption-
wealth ratio of the corresponding period. The elastici ties are obta ined from the impulse-
response functions impl ied by our SVAR estimates . We choose U.S. because i t has both
household house va lue and s tock market capi ta l i zation va lue in data .
starting period
Country Period of coverageNumber of observations
Australia 1986q3—2004q4 74
Belgium 1981q1—2004q4 96
Canada 1981q1—2009q4 116
Finland 1988q2—2004q4 67
Sweden 1986q1—2004q4 76
Switzerland 1981q1—2003q4 92
United Kingdom 1984q2—2004q4 83
United States 1973q1—2009q4 148
100 
 
Figure 3.1. Housing price and stock market index: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
United States 
 
  
         Australia                                     Canada  
 
   
            UK                                    US 
 
Notes: index = 100 for both housing price and stock market capitalization at the 
beginning of data time series for each country. For the United States, the series of market 
value of household owned real estate is also included. 
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Figure 3.2. Housing price and stock market index: Belgium, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland 
 
  
             Belgium                                  Finland 
 
  
            Sweden                                  Switzerland 
 
Notes: index = 100 for both housing price and stock market capitalization at the 
beginning of data time series for each country. For the United States, the series of market 
value of household owned real estate is also included. 
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Figure 3.3. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing 
prices: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States 
 
  
         Australia                                     Canada  
 
   
            UK                              US 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 3.4. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing 
prices: Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland 
 
  
             Belgium                                  Finland 
 
  
            Sweden                                  Switzerland 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 3.5. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock 
market capitalization: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States 
 
  
         Australia                                     Canada  
 
  
            UK                              US 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 3.6. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock 
market capitalization: Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland 
 
  
             Belgium                                  Finland 
 
  
            Sweden                                  Switzerland 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 3.7. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to housing 
value or housing price: United States 
 
      
US (estimated with housing price index)         US (estimated with housing value) 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Impulse response functions of consumption given a 10% increase to stock 
market capitalization: United States 
 
      
US (estimated with housing price index)         US (estimated with housing value) 
Notes: dashed lines indicate 90% confidence interval; dotted lines indicate 68% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 3.9. Scatter Plots of consumption responses to a 10% housing price stock 
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APPENDIX 
Derivatives 
The derivates in (24)-(28) are as follows: 
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On the other hand, plugging adjustment cost equation into equation (20) and 
manipulating the obtained one will yield:  
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if capital gains tax rate decreases, 
t
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
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θ
θ1
1  will increase which means an increase in 
oq . On the other hand, oq  will decline becaues of the decrease in 
g
c
θ
θ . Thus, we can 
conclude that the latter impact dominates the former. 
Once the adjustment cost equation is plugged into equation (20), after some 
manipulation, we will end up with the following: 
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=   (37) 
As investment tax credit declines, lt , investment level will decrease. Yet, on the 
other hand, the increase in q  will stimulate investment. From figure (I.21), one can infer 
that the impacts of the decrease in lt  dominates the effects of the decrease in q  on 
investment level in the short-run. However, it should be noted that the shock is temporary 
and dies out over time. Thus, after a certain point, the change in q  outweighs by giving 
rise to an increase in investment as seen in figure.  
Calibrating Parameters 
 To calibrate the model, we choose the parameters in conformance to the best 
practice in the literature, so that we have following initial values: 
0.04=r , 0.33=α , 0.9,=ρ 0.9=µ , 0.8=w , 2.9=χ . 
On the other hand, the country specific tax rate data is obtained from OECD Tax 
Data Base.  
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